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THE BLOODY TRUTH: EXAMINING AMERICA’S BLOOD 
INDUSTRY AND ITS TORT LIABILITY THROUGH THE 
ARKANSAS PRISON PLASMA SCANDAL 
ABSTRACT 
Most of the time, blood transfusions are safe. Over the years, however, 
tragedies connected to tainted blood and blood products have ripped 
through communities on an international scale. Blood contaminated with 
hepatitis C, HIV, and hepatitis B has sickened and killed recipients, caus-
ing financial, political, and legal repercussions for those found responsi-
ble. 
This Note seeks to explore one such tragedy: the Arkansas Prison 
Plasma Scandal. Occurring between 1982 and 1994 at the Cummins Pris-
on in Grady, Arkansas, the scandal stemmed from the operation of a blood 
product center in which prisoners “bled” in exchange for $7 to $10 per 
donation. It is alleged that tainted blood products from the prison were 
distributed internationally, and that thousands of people became infected 
with hepatitis C as a result. 
This Note will address: (1) the nature of the blood business in Ameri-
ca, (2) the events at the Cummins prison plasma center and the ensuing 
scandal, (3) the response of the Canadian and British legal systems and 
governments to the tainted blood victims, and (4) the likely outcome of a 
negligence claim against the allegedly responsible parties if the victims 
had successfully filed suit. 
With this analysis, this Note will show that even if all the alleged facts 
about the circumstances at the prison plasma center are true, injured 
parties suing in the United States would not be able to prevail in a negli-
gence claim because of the impossibility of proving causation in American 
blood product litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[W]hy was it that we became the dumping ground for your poison?” 
~Michael McCarthy, plaintiff (Canadian hemophiliac infected by tainted blood).1 
Blood runs through every human vein,2 pumping through the human 
heart3 and powering human life.4 Unlike other necessities such as water, 
oil, and even air, blood has no equivalent substitute.5 Throughout the cen-
turies, this precious, life-sustaining fluid has intrigued poets, philosophers, 
and doctors. In surgery, on the battlefield, and during childbirth, blood 
transfusions often make the difference between life and death. 
Today, we still do not entirely understand blood and its unique and 
mysterious properties,6 and that lack of understanding has sometimes led 
to tragedy.7 Blood is easily contaminated and can become dangerous when 
it is tainted or misused.8 Diseased blood turns into poison when trans-
fused, causing illness or death for those who receive it.9 
The importance of the U.S. blood supply cannot be overstated: accord-
ing to the American Red Cross, “[e]very two seconds someone in the U.S. 
needs blood,”10 and in the year 2001 alone, fourteen million blood transfu-
                                                 
1 Nihal Kaneira, Canadian Victims of Tainted Blood to Sue U.S., Clinton, GLOBAL 
NEWS WIRE, Feb. 26, 1999. 
2 See LAURALEE SHERWOOD, HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY: FROM CELLS TO SYSTEMS 371 
(Cengage Learning, 7th ed. 2010) (“[V]eins serve as a blood reservoir .... Under resting 
conditions, the veins contain more than 60% of the total blood volume.”). 
3 See id. at 372. 
4 JUSTICE HORACE KREVER, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE BLOOD SYSTEM IN 
CANADA 11 (1997), available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/hcan-scan/commis 
sion_blood_final_rep-e/index.html [hereinafter KREVER COMMISSION REPORT]. 
5 See Blood Facts, BLOODBOOK.COM, http://www.bloodbook.com/facts.html#GENE 
RAL (last visited Mar. 4, 2012). But see Blood Substitutes, BROWN UNIV. DIV. OF 
BIOLOGY & MED. (2006), http://biomed.brown.edu/Courses/BI108/2006-108websites 
/group09artificialblood/Pages/history.htm. Scientists are working on developing blood 
alternatives: “Today, the two most promising red cell substitutes are perfluorocarbon-
based oxygen carriers (PFBOCs) and hemoglobin-based oxygen carriers (HBOCs).” Id. 
6 See DOUGLAS STARR, BLOOD: AN EPIC HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND COMMERCE at x 
(1998). 
7 See Blood Facts, supra note 5. But see Blood Substitutes, supra note 5. 
8 See Blood Facts, supra note 5. 
9 Id. 
10 Blood Facts and Statistics, AM. RED CROSS (2012), http://www.redcrossblood.org 
/learn-about-blood/blood-facts-and-statistics. 
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sions occurred.11 At the same time, the demand for blood is rising at a rate 
that available donations and viable donors fail to match.12 
This blood shortage means that the commodity is extremely expen-
sive,13 resulting in the development of a lucrative business surrounding its 
collection and distribution.14 Indeed, the blood business has been growing 
both domestically and internationally15 for decades, and today it is a 
multibillion dollar industry16—an industry that few people know much 
about. 
Most of the time, especially in recent decades, blood transfusions are 
safe.17 However, over the years, a few tragedies connected to tainted blood 
and blood products have ripped through communities on an international 
scale.18 Blood contaminated with hepatitis C, HIV, and hepatitis B has 
sickened and killed recipients, causing financial, political, and legal reper-
cussions for those found responsible.19 
This Note seeks to explore one such tragedy, the Arkansas Prison 
Plasma Scandal, which occurred between 1982 and 1994, when the Cum-
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 See Blood Substitutes, supra note 5 (“According to Doctor Bernadine Healy, former 
president of the American Red Cross, donations are increasing by about 2–3% annually 
in the United States, but demand is climbing by between 6–8%.”). 
13 See generally STARR, supra note 6. 
14 See Lisa M. Korsten, Note, The Global Market for Blood: A Proposal for Expan-
sion and a Consistent System of International Regulation, 11 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 227, 227 
(1993) (“It is estimated that there is a $2.5 billion market for transfusion blood in the 
United States alone.”). 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17
 See Knowing Your Options, AM.’S BLOOD CTRS., http://www.americasblood.org/go 
.cfm?do=Page.View&pid=247 (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) (“The risk of contracting HIV 
from a blood transfusion is about one in 1.5 million. That is much less than the risk of 
dying from a lightning strike. Thanks to new blood testing procedures, the chance of 
getting HCV is about the same.”). 
18 See James Harder, More Bad Blood out of Arkansas, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Mar. 
12, 2001, at 18. 
19 See Linda M. Dorney, Comment, Culpable Conduct with Impunity: The Blood In-
dustry and the FDA’s Responsibility for the Spread of AIDS Through Blood Products, 3 J. 
PHARMACY & L. 129, 130 (1994). Even by 1994, blood transfusions had infected a report-
ed 6,311 Americans with HIV, and plasma concentrates infected approximately 12,000 
American hemophiliacs. Id. 
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mins Prison in Grady, Arkansas, operated a blood product20 center in 
which prisoners “bled”21 in exchange for $7 to $10 per donation.22 
As of 1982, prison blood and plasma were no longer approved for use 
in America23 or Canada,24 because prisoners possess a significantly higher 
risk of infection than the general population.25 The Arkansas Department 
of Corrections (ADC) managed to avoid Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA or Agency) warnings and recommendations by employing private 
organizations to run the prison blood and plasma program.26 These organi-
zations then sold the blood products to a Canadian blood broker,27 who 
distributed them to countries around the world.28 The ultimate buyers of 
the product were unaware that they were providing their populations with 
prisoners’ blood.29 It is alleged that this “blood laundering”30 resulted in 
thousands of people becoming infected with hepatitis C (especially hemo-
philiacs, for reasons explained in greater depth below).31 
Victims of this tainted blood launched class action lawsuits in most of 
the purchasing countries,32 and the Canadian government ordered a crimi-
nal probe into the circumstances surrounding these transactions.33 Howev-
                                                 
20 For the purposes of this Note, the term “blood products” refers to platelets, whole 
blood, fresh frozen plasma, and blood coagulants. 
21 As will be explained in more detail below, the prisoners donated their plasma 
through a special process. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
22 Telephone Interview with Kelly Duda, Producer, Concrete Films (Jan. 18, 2011). 
This price started out in the early 1960s at $3 to $5 per donation, and increased in the 
1980s from $7 to $10. Email Interview with Kelly Duda, Producer, Concrete Films (Nov. 
16, 2011) [hereinafter Duda Interview II]. 
23 See Harder, supra note 18. 
24 See Anthony DePalma, Suit Says Canada Imported Tainted Blood from U.S. In-
mates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1999, at A4. 
25 See André Picard & Anne McIlroy, Hemophiliacs Launch $1-Billion Suit over Use 
of U.S. Prisoners’ Plasma, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Jan. 28, 1999, at A7. 
26 Telephone Interview with Kelly Duda, supra note 22. 
27 See Harder, supra note 18. 
28 Id. 
29 FACTOR 8 (Concrete Films 2005). 
30 Telephone Interview with Kelly Duda, supra note 22. 
31 See Michael J. Miller, Note, Strict Liability, Negligence and the Standard of Care 
for Transfusion-Transmitted Disease, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 473, 475 (1994); see also discus-
sion infra Part I.A.1. 
32 See Tomoko Otake, Blood Battle Is About the Past and Future, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 
14, 2006. Plaintiffs have been reasonably successful in France and Japan, where respon-
sible parties in tainted blood scandals have been sent to prison. Id.; see also Ian Birrell, 
2,000 Dead and Still No Justice for the Victims of Britain’s Blood Transfusion Scandal, 
DAILY MAIL, Oct. 19, 2010 (Good Health Viewpoint) (“In Canada, the Red Cross was 
prosecuted for negligence.”). 
33 See FACTOR 8, supra note 29. 
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er, as of March 2012, there are no available records of either a victim 
filing a similar lawsuit in the United States, or of any U.S. criminal inves-
tigation of the scandal occurring.34 
This Note will address: (1) the nature of the blood business in Ameri-
ca, (2) the events at the Cummins prison plasma center and the ensuing 
scandal, (3) the responses of the Canadian and British legal systems and 
governments to the tainted blood victims, and (4) the likely outcome of a 
negligence claim against the allegedly responsible parties if the victims 
had successfully filed suit. The time for such actions has now passed,35 but 
this Note will contrast the events at Cummins with similar hepatitis and 
HIV transfusion litigation to explain the reasoning a court might follow. 
With this analysis, this Note will show that even if all the alleged facts 
about the circumstances at the prison plasma center are true, injured par-
ties suing in the United States would not be able to prevail in a negligence 
claim because of the impossibility of proving causation in American blood 
product litigation. 
Because no direct American legal action regarding the information in 
this Note has occurred, it is impossible to be sure all the facts regarding 
the prison plasma program are true, though there are more than enough 
witness accounts, international lawsuits, newspaper articles, inquiries, 
documentaries, and reports to provide the evidence needed to state a 
claim.36 The negligence suit discussed below is based on the assumption 
that all of the plaintiffs’ allegations could be proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence.37 
                                                 
34 But cf. Barrie McKenna, Canadian Hemophiliacs to Sue U.S. Government, THE 
GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Feb. 25, 1999, at A16. This proposed lawsuit never came to 
fruition. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
35 The typical statute of limitations for negligence and products liability cases is ap-
proximately four years, and because most of these infections occurred in the 1980s and 
1990s, the statute of limitations would preclude the case from being heard. See, e.g., 
Lynnette S. Pisone, Case Note, Walls v. Armour: Upholding the Principles of Liability, 3 
J. PHARMACY & L. 225, 228–29 (1994) (discussing Florida’s four-year statute of limita-
tions). 
36 WILLARD B. RIANO, FUNDAMENTALS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 495 (Rex Printing Co., 
Inc. 2005) (“In considering the dismissal of a case for failure to state a cause of action, 
the inquiry is the sufficiency of the material allegations of the complaint and not the 
veracity of the allegations.”). 
37 THOMAS BUCKLES, LAWS OF EVIDENCE 25–26 (Thomson 2003). A preponderance 
of the evidence is the standard of proof for a civil suit, and it means that the trier of fact 
must find that the plaintiff’s claim is more likely true than not. Id. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Blood, Blood Products, and Tainted Blood 
1. Blood and Blood Products 
A healthy adult body contains four to five liters of whole blood.38 
Whole blood is rarely utilized in transfusions anymore: as science ad-
vanced, medical personnel learned how to transfer only the blood compo-
nents required by the recipient.39 The basic blood transfusion involves the 
simple transfer of red blood cells from one person to another, usually at a 
hospital during a surgery.40 
In addition to this method, however, is the lesser-known and more 
profitable use of plasma,41 which can be used to manufacture clotting 
products42 for hemophiliacs.43 The use of these clotting factors, beginning 
in the 1960s, has doubled the average hemophiliac’s life expectancy.44 
Under this process, after blood is collected, it is “spun off”45 through 
plasmapheresis,46 and its component parts are used for different purpos-
                                                 
38 KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 15. Each whole blood cell is com-
posed of three different components: plasma, red blood cells, and the “buffy coat” (a thin 
layer containing white blood cells and platelets). Id. 
39 Id. at 45. 
40 Id. at 3, 24. 
41 Walter Rugaber, Prison Drug and Plasma Projects Leave Fatal Trail, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 29, 1969, at 1. Plasma makes up about fifty-five percent of a unit of blood. Under 
the process of plasmapheresis, an entire unit of blood is taken from the donor, then the 
plasma is spun out and the remaining cells are re-injected. Id. 
42 See Dorney, supra note 19, at 133. 
43 Hemophilia is a genetic blood disorder that occurs primarily in males and causes 
spontaneous internal bleeding. Until scientific developments in the 1960s allowed hemo-
philiacs to inject themselves with plasma products, many of them died at a young age, 
and those with severe cases could not even engage in normal daily activities for fear of 
causing a deadly bleed. Eric A. Feldman, Blood Justice: Courts, Conflict, and Compensa-
tion in Japan, France, and the United States, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651, 664 (2000). 
Before the widespread use of the clotting products, the average hemophiliac died at age 
eleven; since these products have grown more commonplace, that age has risen to twen-
ty-one. Moore v. Armour Pharm. Co., 88-392-CIV-T-15C, 1990 U.S. Dist. WL 369571, 
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 1990). 
44 STARR, supra note 6, at xiv. 
45 The unit of blood is placed in a centrifuge which spins off the plasma, allowing the 
rest of the blood to be returned to the donor. See DePalma, supra note 24, at A4. 
46 This new method greatly increased the quantity of plasma available because it was 
no longer necessary to use whole blood (including red blood cells); thus, the donors did 
not become anemic. Also, red blood cells take several weeks to replenish, while plasma 
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es.47 The plasma of thousands of donors is pooled48 together49 to create 
factor concentrates that form a blood product, known as Factor VIII,50 
used to medicate hemophiliacs.51 
Depending on the severity of the disease, a hemophiliac might need to 
use Factor VIII several times a week.52 This means, essentially, that peo-
ple who are already ill with a life-threatening disease and a compromised 
immune system have no alternative but to inject themselves with plasma 
hundreds of times a year. If one of the plasma donors (out of many hun-
dreds or thousands53) is infected with a blood-borne disease, the entire 
product will be tainted.54 From this point, it is extremely likely that the 
hemophiliac, an innocent bystander,55 will contract the disease as well, 
and might unknowingly pass it to another. Because of the factors dis-
                                                                                                                         
regenerates within days. Because of these improvements, donations could occur much 
more frequently and safely. STARR, supra note 6, at 207–08. 
47 SALLY V. RUDMANN, TEXTBOOK OF BLOOD BANKING AND TRANSFUSION MEDICINE 
233 (Elsevier Saunders, 2d ed. 2005). 
48 At the same time the pool of donors for plasma products was growing, the federal 
government stopped using the same process entirely for whole blood because of the 
increased risk of hepatitis and the availability of safer alternatives. Unfortunately, no such 
safer alternatives existed for the clotting factors, so the general prohibition against pool-
ing did not extend to them. STARR, supra note 6, at 225. 
49 See KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 22. The process can include an-
ywhere from 1,000 to 60,000 donors. Id. 
50 Factor VIII and Factor IX are actually proteins in the blood that allow coagulation 
to occur. Hemophiliacs suffer from an insufficiency of these proteins. Wadleigh v. 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 413 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The synthetic replace-
ments that are created by donated plasma are also known as Factor VIII and Factor IX. 
Id. at 414. This Note is primarily concerned with Factor VIII. 
51 KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. 
52 Id. 
53 Feldman, supra note 43, at 665. In the words of documentary filmmaker Kelly 
Duda, “units of plasma are pooled into large vats in the making of Factor VIII (imagine 
some poison being stirred into a large pot of soup).” Duda Interview II, supra note 22. 
54 Gullone v. Bayer Corp. (In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig.), 
484 F.3d 951, 954 (7th Cir. 2007). To “cleanse” tainted blood of HIV and hepatitis C, the 
blood bank must utilize a heat treatment or other method of viral inactivation on the 
blood or blood product before it is distributed. Id. A government-sponsored 1995 report 
by the Institute of Medicine found that plasma product manufacturers proved especially 
slow to implement these safety measures because there were no competitive incentives, 
and the government failed to insist the system be revamped to comply with new stand-
ards. Donna Shaw, Regulators Blamed in AIDS Deaths Lapses Led to Tainted Blood, 
Says New Report, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 14, 1995, at A01. 
55 See Feldman, supra note 43, at 669 (“Hemophiliacs ... considered themselves the 
passive, ‘innocent’ victims of a ‘drug-induced disaster’ that was the fault of physicians, 
elected officials, government regulators, pharmaceutical companies, and blood banks 
....”). 
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cussed above, the chance of a recipient becoming infected by a blood 
product is much higher than the risk of infection from whole blood.56 
The FDA is responsible for regulating the manufacture of Factor VIII 
products57 under its authority from the Pure Food and Drug Act and the 
Public Health Service Act.58 The Agency is charged with approving any 
changes to the manufacturing process or packaging of the clotting factor, 
and it licenses the producers and approves the concentrates before they are 
distributed.59 In addition, the Agency inspects the blood plasma collection 
facilities producing Factor VIII, and these centers must comply with FDA 
rules.60 
If these rules are violated, those responsible can be imprisoned or 
fined,61 and licenses can be suspended (temporary) or revoked (perma-
nent).62 States are allowed to supplement FDA regulations63 as long as any 
additional state laws do not conflict with the federal regulations. 
2. Hepatitis C 
There are three common viral forms of hepatitis: A, B, and C.64 The 
basic definition of all three is: “[A]n inflammation of the liver caused by a 
hepatitis virus.”65 Hepatitis C is caused by contact with blood and bodily 
fluids of an already infected individual, and no vaccine currently exists to 
prevent the disease.66 The risk of transmitting hepatitis A and B through 
blood has been known and guarded against for many years; hepatitis C, 
however, was not identified or detectable until 1988, after thousands of 
                                                 
56 Id. at 665. 
57 Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d 404, 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
58 Florence Shu-Acquaye & Leanne Innet, Human Blood and Its Transfusion: The 
Twists and Turns of Legal Thinking, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 33, 42–43 (2005). 
59 Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d at 407–08. 
60 Dorney, supra note 19, at 134–35. 
61 Id. 
62 Duda Interview II, supra note 22. 
63 Dorney, supra note 19, at 134–35. 
64 A.D.A.M., Inc., Hepatitis Overview, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2010) http://health.ny 
times.com/health/guides/disease/hepatitis/background.html. Other less common forms of 
hepatitis include hepatitis D, E, F, and G. Id. 
65 Frequently Asked Questions, HEPATITIS FOUND. INT’L, http://www.hepfi.org/living 
/liv_questions.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2012). 
66 Id. 
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people were already infected with the illness.67 No test was available to 
check blood products for hepatitis C until 1992.68 
Only ten percent of those infected with hepatitis C will escape devel-
oping chronic hepatitis.69 Of the ninety percent with chronic hepatitis, 
twenty percent will develop cirrhosis of the liver, and one to five percent 
will develop liver cancer within twenty years.70 According to the National 
Foundation for Infectious Diseases, 8,000 to 10,000 deaths result every 
year from hepatitis C infections, and half of the 4,000 liver transplants that 
occur annually are for victims of this disease.71 The only treatments avail-
able are extremely time-consuming, complicated, and expensive, and they 
prove successful less than half of the time.72 It is unlikely that a foolproof 
vaccine can be developed because the disease is extremely mutable.73 
Dartmouth Medical School estimates that, “[a]ssuming an estimated sur-
vival of 40 years, the annual health care costs for the affected U.S. popula-
tion with chronic hepatitis C may be as high as $9 billion.”74 
B. The Blood Business 
1. How Much Is the Blood Business Worth? 
Blood is one of the most precious and expensive resources in the 
world, and it follows that the blood industry is extremely profitable.75 In 
1998, a barrel of crude oil was worth $13 per barrel; measured equally, 
whole blood was worth over $20,000.76 If the blood were separated, or 
fractionated, into its derivative products,77 the value of the same quantity 
                                                 
67 KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 4. 
68 Andres Rueda, Rethinking Blood Shield Statutes in View of the Hepatitis C Pan-
demic and Other Emerging Threats to the Blood Supply, 34 J. HEALTH L. 419, 423 (2001) 
(“Since 1992, a specific antibody assay (ELISA I) has been used to test blood products 
for hepatitis C ....”). 
69 KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 3. 
70 Hepatitis C, NAT’L FOUND. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES, http://www.nfid.org/fact 
sheets/hepc.shtml (on file with William & Mary Business Law Review). 
71 Id. 
72 Rueda, supra note 68, at 420. 
73 Id. 
74 Hepatitis C: Associated Health Costs—United States, THE C. EVERETT KOOP 
INST.—DARTMOUTH MED. SCH., http://www.epidemic.org/theFacts/theEpidemic/USHeal 
thCareCosts/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2012). 
75 See generally Dorney, supra note 19. 
76 STARR, supra note 6, at x. 
77 For a discussion describing the fractionating process, see supra Part I.A.1. 
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in 1998 rises to more than $67,000, while the barrel of oil, including all of 
its derivatives, was worth $42.78 
By 2001, a blood bank might “charge hospitals anywhere from $55 to 
$130 (with $80 being the national average) per unit of blood. Once a unit 
of blood is divided into red blood cells, plasma, platelets, and other spe-
cialized factors, it produces about $200 in revenues.”79 By 2006, a unit of 
blood cost the buyer approximately $200, and once storage and adminis-
trative costs were factored in, it is estimated that the actual cost was prob-
ably closer to $500.80 
If one calculates the barrel of blood example from 1998 with the up-
dated numbers from 2006, it is possible to estimate the rising value of the 
commodity between those eight years. Assuming the barrel from 1998 
contained the same quantity of the liquid as a standard barrel of oil,81 this 
can be estimated to be about 353.33 blood units per barrel.82 If each unit of 
blood were worth $200, the total price of the same barrel would have risen 
from $67,000 to $70,666, and if each unit were worth $500, the total value 
would be $176,665 per barrel of blood. In contrast, as of March 2012 the 
value of a barrel of WTI Crude Oil was approximately $107, and the value 
of a barrel of Brent Crude Oil was approximately $125.83 
2. How Did the System Evolve? 
a. Poor Oversight and Commercialization 
When the blood business first boomed in the 1960s and 1970s,84 it suf-
fered from poor oversight and regulation.85 This led to cases of blood 
                                                 
78 STARR, supra note 6, at x–xi. 
79 Rueda, supra note 68, at nn.84–85 (2001); see also Scott Hensley, FDA Could OK 
Costly Blood Standards; An Expert Says That like Chicken Soup, Removal of White Cells 
from Blood Supply Can’t Hurt, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Nov. 29, 1999, at 8. 
80 See Blood Substitutes, supra note 5. 
81 A standard barrel of oil contains approximately 159 liters. CHRISTIAN NGÔ & 
JOSEPH B. NATOWITZ, OUR ENERGY FUTURE: RESOURCES, ALTERNATIVES, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 40 (2009). 
82 “A unit of whole blood is 450 milliliters, which is about 0.9510 U.S. pint. For com-
ponents of blood, one unit is the amount of that substance that would normally be found 
in one unit of whole blood. The adult human body contains roughly 12 units of whole 
blood.” Russ Rowlett, How Many? A Dictionary of Units of Measurement, UNIV. OF N.C. 
AT CHAPEL HILL (Oct. 5, 2004), http://www.unc.edu/~row lett/units/dictU.html. 
83 See OIL-PRICE.NET, http://www.oil-price.net/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) (charting 
daily crude oil and commodity prices). 
84 See STARR, supra note 6, at 207. 
85 See Shaw, supra note 54, at A01. 
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harvesting from individuals who should never have been permitted to 
donate.86 Because the industry offered to pay for donations, it attracted 
exactly the wrong populations: indigents, drug addicts, and prisoner 
groups who faced a high risk of diseased blood because they tended to 
have a higher number of sexual partners and engaged more often in drug 
use through needles.87 The danger of acquiring contaminated product 
skyrockets as soon as blood is collected from paid, rather than volunteer, 
donors.88 
Despite the FDA’s supposed authority over the industry, the blood 
product distributors viewed it mainly as a puppet supervisor from the 
1980s through the mid-1990s; a perception caused by the FDA’s lack of 
direct policymaking power and its domination at the hands of the blood 
industry.89 This weakness in regulation allowed the blood business to 
operate with limited oversight, affording protection for the sellers rather 
than the recipients of the blood products.90 
Additionally, blood shield laws became increasingly common for both 
the profit and non-profit industry, exempting suppliers of blood and blood 
products from strict liability.91 This meant that, despite providing an in-
credibly risky product, the business did not need to worry about the possi-
bility of many expensive lawsuits.92 The large donor population, the lax 
supervision, and the diminished threat of litigation resulted in the United 
States becoming the premier producer of blood and plasma products.93 
b. Volunteer Versus Paid Donors 
In 1974, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare published the 
National Blood Policy, recommending that blood donations should be 
                                                 
86 STARR, supra note 6, at 208–10. 
87 See id. at 210. 
88 Pamela T. Westfall, Hepatitis, AIDS and the Blood Product Exemption from Strict 
Products Liability in California: A Reassessment, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1101, 1116 (1986). 
89 Feldman, supra note 43, at 672; see also Salmaan Keshavjee, Sheri Weiser & Ar-
thur Kleinman, Medicine Betrayed: Hemophilia Patients and HIV in the US, 53 SOC. SCI. 
& MED. 1081, 1086 (2001) (describing hemophiliacs’ feelings of betrayal by the govern-
ment for failing to provide adequate oversight, in part because of the “revolving door of 
employment” that they believe existed between the FDA employees and the blood indus-
try). 
90 Feldman, supra note 43, at 672. 
91 See Dorney, supra note 19, at 169 (discussing the problems associated with blood 
shield laws). 
92 See Yi-Chen Su, Revisiting Factor VIII Cases: Is It Time for an Agency Adjudica-
tion System?, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 943, 947–48 (2008). 
93 See STARR, supra note 6, at 208–10. 
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collected only from volunteer donors.94 The plasma industry disregarded 
this warning and continued to offer payment for plasma,95 creating an 
incentive for people—even those who knew themselves to be at risk—to 
continue selling.96 These products were utilized both domestically and 
overseas.97 
One scathing analysis of the blood business came from Richard 
Titmuss, a respected scholar who studied the burgeoning trade of the new 
commodity from the late 1960s through the 1970s.98 He believed that 
monetary compensation for donations provided the wrong incentives: it 
encouraged donors to hide their medical history, rather than revealing it.99 
Titmuss’ conclusion on the system left little to commend the blood busi-
ness: 
[T]he commercialisation [sic] of blood and donor relationships repress-
es the expression of altruism, erodes the sense of community, lowers 
scientific standards, limits both personal and professional freedoms, 
sanctions the making of profits in hospitals and clinical laboratories, le-
galises [sic] hostility between doctor and patient, subjects critical areas 
of medicine to the laws of the marketplace, places immense social costs 
on those least able to bear them—the poor, the sick and the inept—
increases the danger of unethical behaviour [sic] in various sectors of 
medical science and practice, and results in situations in which propor-
tionally more and more blood is supplied by the poor, the unskilled, the 
unemployed ... and other low income groups and categories of exploit-
ed human populations of high blood yielders. Redistribution ... of blood 
and blood products from the poor to the rich appears to be one of the 
dominant effects of the American blood-banking systems.100 
                                                 
94 See National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 9326, 9326–30 (Mar. 8, 1974). 
95 Because plasmapheresis was a fairly uncomfortable procedure at the time, plasma 
centers believed the additional incentive of payment was necessary to ensure adequate 
supply. STARR, supra note 6, at 255. 
96 See generally Harvey Sapolsky, AIDS, Blood Banking, and the Bonds of Communi-
ty, 118 DAEDALUS 145, 145–63 (1989). 
97 See, e.g., Kaneira, supra note 1; Shaw, supra note 54, at A01. For example, Canada 
was unable to domestically process enough plasma to fulfill the country’s needs, so it was 
forced to buy, and trust, American plasma products. See KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 22. 
98 See CATHERINE WALDBY & ROBERT MITCHELL, TISSUE ECONOMIES: BLOOD, 
ORGANS, AND CELL LINES IN LATE CAPITALISM 10 (2006). 
99 See generally RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN 
BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 314 (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., The New Press 1997). 
But see Korsten, supra note 14, at 233–36 (providing a discussion of weaknesses in a 
volunteer-only donation system). 
100 TITMUSS, supra note 99, at 314. 
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This study produced such an impact that Richard Nixon created the Na-
tional Blood Policy, which promoted voluntary blood donations.101 
By 1979, the risks of using paid donors were so well-known that vic-
tims of tainted blood already began bringing negligence lawsuits against 
blood banks for failing to use a voluntary-donor system.102 
c. Prisoners’ Blood and Plasma 
Prisoners proved a perfect target for paid donations because the in-
mates desperately needed money, and plasma donations often brought 
minimal compensation.103 More importantly for the industry, the prisoners 
offered a stable, constant blood source that provided a steady stream of 
product.104 In addition, prison plasma collection centers were automatical-
ly exempt from any real oversight, because plasma was considered a “vital 
resource.”105 This classification meant that, under special short-supply 
provisions governing such resources, drug companies were permitted to 
“buy certain materials from unlicensed, uninspected vendors,”106 thus 
providing no incentive for prisons to improve the health and safety condi-
tions of their plasma programs. 
As early as 1970, the dangers of using prisoners’ blood became public 
knowledge. A 2009 British inquiry into contaminated blood states that: 
“On 29 July 1969 the New York Times carried an article by Walter 
Rugaber, entitled ‘Prison Drug and Plasma Projects Leave Fatal Trail.’ In 
1970, the New York Times wrote of the ‘transfusion roulette’ played by 
the blood industry.”107 By 1982, the FDA informally asked U.S. fractiona-
tors108 to stop purchasing blood donated by prison inmates109 for domestic 
consumption because it was considered too risky. A disproportionate 
                                                 
101 Korsten, supra note 14, at 232. 
102 See, e.g., Gilmore v. St. Anthony Hosp., 598 P.2d 1200, 1202 (1979) (holding that 
summary judgment was not appropriate when determining whether a blood bank acted 
negligently by utilizing paid donors). 
103 Telephone Interview with Kelly Duda, supra note 22. 
104 STARR, supra note 6, at 210. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 INDEPENDENT PUBLIC INQUIRY REPORT ON NHS SUPPLIED CONTAMINATED BLOOD 
AND BLOOD PRODUCTS 18 (2009), available at http://www.archercbbp.com/report.php 
[hereinafter ARCHER INQUIRY]. 
108 KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 377 (“Although the Food and Drug 
Administration used the language of requests and recommendations, its guidelines were 
treated as mandatory.”). 
109 Id. at 372. 
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number of prisoners were infected with hepatitis C and HIV110 compared 
to the free population,111 and prisoners proved more likely to engage in 
high-risk sex and drug use, perpetuating the spread of these diseases.112 
All of the fractionators complied with the FDA’s request.113 
However, the FDA continued to license a few prison plasma centers 
that were exporting the product, a practice that was still permitted.114 A 
1984 information bulletin about prison plasma centers lists ongoing pro-
grams in Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana,115 Tennessee, Nevada, and Mis-
souri.116 Although in practice domestic prison sales ended in 1983,117 the 
system has never been officially prohibited in the United States.118 
d. The AIDS Comparison 
Although hepatitis C does not inevitably result in death, as AIDS 
does,119 there are certainly parallels between the victims of blood contam-
inated with AIDS and blood contaminated with hepatitis C. As with hepa-
titis C, scientists at first were not sure that AIDS passed through blood.120 
It was not until 1982 that an FDA memorandum to manufacturers of blood 
                                                 
110 Whitney Hinkle, Giving Until It Hurts: Prisoners Are Not the Answer to the Na-
tional Organ Shortage, 35 IND. L. REV. 593, 605–06 (2002) (“A study conducted by the 
National Institute of Justice showed that the incidence rate of AIDS cases for the general 
public was 14.65 cases per 100,000 people compared to 202 cases per 100,000 in federal 
and state correctional facilities.”); see also Rueda, supra note 68, at 419 (“40% of our 
country’s prisoners ... are afflicted by [hepatitis C].”). 
111 See Hinkle, supra note 110, at 606. 
112 See Picard & McIlroy, supra note 25, at A7. 
113 KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 372. 
114 Dennis Bueckert, Prisoners Donated Blood as Part of Rehabilitation, THE GLOBE 
& MAIL (Canada), Feb. 12, 1999, at A6. 
115 Prisoners at the Louisiana Department of Corrections at Angola actually brought 
suit against the company running their plasma center in 1981, contending they were paid 
below minimum wage in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The plasma compa-
ny, Sara, Inc. established the program in 1976 and paid the prisoners $3 per day and no 
overtime. The court found that the prisoners were not employees of Sara, Inc., but rather 
inmates who were not entitled to minimum wage. Alexander v. Sara, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 
42, 44 (M.D. La. 1983), aff’d, 721 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Lavigne v. Sara, 
Inc., 424 So. 2d 273, 274 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
116 Suzi Parker, Dumping Scandal: The Export of Bad Blood, SALON.COM (Feb. 25, 
1999), http://www.salon.com/1999/02/25/news_185/. 
117 KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 377. They also stopped using 
plasma from other identified problem areas, including New York, San Francisco, and the 
Hollywood area of Los Angeles. Id. 
118 Id. at 618. 
119 See Dorney, supra note 19, at 138. 
120 See id. at 140–41. 
2012] THE BLOODY TRUTH 613 
 
products warned that: “Although the cause of the outbreak is unknown, the 
information suggest[s] that a transmissible agent might be involved and 
concern about transmission through blood and blood products has been 
raised.”121 
Two years later, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) informed those 
in the business that blood transfusions “appear responsible for AIDS 
among hemophilia patients,”122 and provided some preliminary measures 
to reduce the spread of the disease.123 Unfortunately, as occurred later with 
hepatitis C, a significant number of those in charge of blood banks took 
little notice of these warnings and persisted in selling the blood without 
implementing the recommended improvements.124 Many companies con-
tinued to export the unchecked blood overseas for more than a year after 
the government finally established safety processes for domestic blood.125 
As a result of the blood bankers’ inaction, more than 10,000 hemophil-
iacs and thousands of other blood transfusion recipients became infected 
with the deadly HIV virus during the 1980s.126 The lawsuits resulting from 
the AIDS scandal provide a relevant precedent for victims who contracted 
hepatitis C, as many allegedly did following the Arkansas prison scandal. 
II. THE ARKANSAS PRISON SCANDAL 
A. What Happened? A History of the Prison 
1. History 
In 1970, the Arkansas District Court declared that certain practices at 
the Cummins Prison in Grady, Arkansas, amounted to cruel and unusual 
                                                 
121 Deborah Tedford, Hemophiliacs Clash with Drug Companies; Suit: Firms Lax 
with AIDS Tests in ‘80s, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1994, at 1. 
122 See Walt Bogdanich & Eric Koli, 2 Paths of Bayer Drug in 80’s: Riskier One 
Steered Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at A1. 
123 INST. OF MED., HIV AND THE BLOOD SUPPLY: AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS 
DECISIONMAKING 101–06 (Lauren B. Leveton, Harold C. Sox, Jr. & Michael A. Stoto 
eds., 1995). 
124 See Robert Steinbuch, The Executive-Internalization Approach to High-Risk Cor-
porate Behavior: Establishing Individual Criminal Liability for the Intentional or Reck-
less Introduction of Excessively Dangerous Products or Services into the Stream of 
Commerce, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 324 (2006–2007). 
125 See id. at 325. 
126 See, e.g., Harder, supra note 18; see also Michael McLeod, Bad Blood: Every Day, 
a Hemophiliac Dies of AIDS; It Didn’t Have to Happen, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 19, 
1993, at 10. 
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punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.127 A 
1969 description of the prisoners at Cummins by the court stated that: 
Many of the inmates are psychopathic and sociopathic; some of them 
are aggressive homosexuals. Many of the inmates are hardened crimi-
nals and some of them are extremely dangerous to society in general, to 
their keepers, and to fellow inmates. Many of them are malingerers and 
will go to any lengths to avoid work. Many are prone to destroy State 
property, even items designed for their welfare and comfort.128 
The court in Holt v. Sarver discussed the problems the prison admin-
istration faced, including its difficulties in keeping the inmates disciplined 
and the administration’s lack of funding.129 Because Arkansas is one of the 
rare states that refuses to pay its prisoners for their labor,130 the court not-
ed: “The only legitimate way in which a convict at Cummins can earn 
money is to sell blood to the prison blood bank.”131 
By the time of the Arkansas blood scandal in the 1980s through the 
1990s, the blood system was not the only problem plaguing the peniten-
tiary.132 Accusations and investigations of murder, rape, bribery, embez-
zlement, and poor medical care were ongoing, and the state government 
was working to end a system of bloated bonuses for the prison officials.133 
Arkansas newspapers described the prison system as a “fiefdom” or a 
“cartel” run by three prominent politicians: state Senator Knox Nelson of 
Pine Bluff, state Representative William F. “Bill” Foster of England, and 
Arkansas Department of Corrections Director A.L. “Art” Lockhart.134 
All these internal problems meant that, as one former member of the 
Arkansas Department of Corrections admitted: “We weren’t focused on 
plasma.”135 
                                                 
127 See generally Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) [hereinafter Holt 
II], aff’d, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). 
128 Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 829–30 (E.D. Ark. 1969) [hereinafter Holt I]. 
129 See id. at 830. 
130 See Mara Leveritt, Bloody Awful: How Money and Politics Contaminated Arkan-
sas’s Prison Plasma Program, ARK. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007 (Top Stories), available at 
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/bloody-awful/Content?oid=863387. 
131 Holt I, 300 F. Supp. at 829. 
132 See Leveritt, supra note 130. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. At the time, there were claims that those in charge, and their friends, were ille-
gally profiting from the prison. Id. 
135 Id. 
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2. The Prison Plasma System 
The Arkansas Prison Blood and Plasma Center existed at the Cummins 
Unit Infirmary at the Cummins prison in Grady, Arkansas, from 1963 
through 1994.136 Authorities decided to allow prisoners to donate blood 
and plasma to rehabilitate themselves and for business purposes; this 
method provided an assured group of donors who would donate on a regu-
lar basis and whose blood product could be picked up from one central 
location.137 Prisoners were paid $7 per donation138—“like ‘little cows,’” 
one government official commented later139—and the prison system sold 
this same unit for more than $100.140 
Official estimates state that the Arkansas prisons produced from 300 to 
500 units of blood every weekend.141 A large portion of the plasma col-
lected from the blood was utilized to create Factor VIII.142 When the units 
were being collected during the 1980s, no test for hepatitis C or 
HIV/AIDS existed.143 
B. Where Did the Tainted Blood Go? 
In 1978, Health Management Associates (HMA), a private company, 
was given authority to run both the medical and plasma programs at 
Cummins Prison.144 Cutter Laboratories, one of the major American blood 
product manufacturers, bought plasma from the Arkansas prisons from the 
1960s to 1982—the year U.S. companies stopped purchasing prison 
blood.145 An internal memo from Cutter Laboratories illustrates the atti-
tude towards the risks of prison blood at the time: 
                                                 
136 FACTOR 8, supra note 29. 
137 See Bueckert, supra note 114, at A6. 
138 James B. Bienvenu, Letter to the Editor, Documentary Shocking, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE (Little Rock), Aug. 2, 2007. 
139 Birrell, supra note 32. 
140 Bienvenu, supra note 138. 
141 See Bueckert, supra note 114, at A6. 
142 Philip Martin, On Film: Non-fiction Debut Needs Big Release, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE (Little Rock), Apr. 21, 2006 (Moviestyle). 
143 See DePalma, supra note 24, at A4. 
144 See Harder, supra note 18. 
145 See Parker, supra note 116. 
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Take no extraordinary actions. There are no data to support the emo-
tional arguments that prison plasma collected from adequately screened 
prisoners is ‘bad.’ To exclude such plasma from manufacturer of our 
coagulation product would only be a sop or gratuity to the Gay Rights 
... and would presage further pressure to exclude plasma collected from 
the Mexican border and the paid donor.146 
Because of the warnings against the use of prison blood in transfusions 
within the U.S. after 1982,147 the prison system decided to ship the blood 
abroad instead.148 The blood was sold to a Montreal company, Continental 
Pharma Cryno149 (the biggest blood broker in Canada), which then sold to 
Switzerland, Spain, Japan, Italy, and Toronto-based Connaught Laborato-
ries,150 who subsequently distributed it to the Canadian Red Cross. In at 
least one case, the blood was sent back to the United States.151 
After HMA was cited in 1983 for health and safety violations, it creat-
ed a subsidiary called Arkansas Blood Components Inc. (ABC Plasma),152 
under which it continued to sell the blood.153 ABC Plasma remained on 
Connaught’s list of approved suppliers in March of 1984.154 
In 1986, for reasons explained further below, HMA’s contract ended, 
but the plasma center continued operation under two different organiza-
tions (which followed HMA’s distribution patterns),155 until the program 
ended in 1994.156 
                                                 
146 Id. 
147 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
148 Martin, supra note 142. 
149 Cryno already had a reputation for buying risky blood products; the company had 
previously been accused of purchasing blood from Russian corpses (which they allegedly 
relabeled to hide the source) and from Haitian slums. See Birrell, supra note 32. 
150 See Harder, supra note 18. At the time, Canada Development Corporation (CDC), 
a Canadian government-owned corporation, controlled Connaught. See Dennis Bueckert, 
Finance Staff Slammed for Withholding Files: Blood-Scandal Documents Linked Martin, 
CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 26, 2002, at A8. 
151 Tainted Blood: Poison from the Prisons, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 1999, at 36, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/319249. 
152 See Tim Harper, Tainted Blood Linked to Theft, Arson, THE TORONTO STAR, May 
21, 1999 (News). 
153 See Canadian Press, Tainted Blood Kept Flowing, Film Suggests, THE RECORD 
(Kitchener-Waterloo), Nov. 21, 2003, at D15. 
154 See Mark Kennedy, Opposition to Question Martin Tainted-Blood Link, OTTAWA 
CITIZEN, May 25, 1999, at A3. 
155 See Suzi Parker, Blood Money, SALON.COM (Dec. 24, 1998), http://www.salon.co 
m/1998/12/24/cov_23news/. 
156 See Harder, supra note 18. 
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C. What Were the Conditions of the Plasma Program? 
Inmates interviewed for a documentary on the prison-blood scandal, 
Factor 8,157 claimed that the prisoners themselves ran the plasma program, 
resulting in overbleeding,158 bleeding disqualified donors,159 unsafe condi-
tions for the donations generally,160 and the destruction and falsification of 
records and evidence.161 Multiple witnesses to the events claimed that the 
plasma center accepted some donations from prisoners known to fail the 
required qualifications.162 A previous inmate, Lewis Sorrells, described 
the conditions at the prison: “You had prisoners bribing prisoners, prison-
ers bribing officials, officials offering certain deals for them to bleed for 
extra money or drugs.”163 Sorrells himself passed away from hepatitis C 
shortly after the interview; he became infected with the disease during his 
time at Cummins prison.164 
The Canadian Hemophilia Society claims that the plasma administra-
tors allowed some inmates to bleed even after being diagnosed with hepa-
titis C, and permitted some to donate as often as sixty times per year.165 
During FDA investigations, officials documented numerous violations, 
including the use of dirty needles (which resulted in inmates infecting 
each other), and a hepatitis B testing laboratory out of commission for two 
                                                 
157 FACTOR 8, supra note 29. 
158 The overbleeding occurred when the donating prisoners bribed the supervising 
prisoners to be allowed to bleed more often, thus enabling them to receive additional 
payments. See DePalma, supra note 24, at A4 (showing bribery); Bill Dunphy, Canadi-
ans to Sue Clinton in Tainted Blood Scandal: US Prison Blood Infected 1,000, 
HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Canada), Feb. 25, 1999, at A1 (highlighting overbleeding). 
159 Dunphy, supra note 158, at A1. 
160 These unsafe conditions included reports of problems such as spoiled plasma being 
refrozen and then sold, and dirty needles being used by multiple prisoners to take their 
blood. FACTOR 8, supra note 29. 
161 Dunphy, supra note 158. 
162 See Dennis Bueckert, Health Department Memo Says Use of US Prison Blood 
Products Continued in Canada After Being Halted in the United States Because US 
Authorities Did Not Tell a Canadian Broker the Products Were Unsafe, CANADIAN BUS. 
& CURRENT AFFAIRS, Feb. 23, 2000. For example, bled prisoners included those known 
to be ill with hepatitis B, which is considered an indicator for AIDS. DePalma, supra note 
24, at A4; see also FACTOR 8, supra note 29 (showing interviews of prisoners claiming 
that even when donors were known to be homosexuals or drug users, the administrators 
at the plasma center allowed them to bleed). 
163 Dennis Bueckert, “Bleeding” for Smokes a Grave Mistake: Ex-Con Talks of Pris-
on Blood Sent to Canada, HAMILTON SPECTATOR (Canada), Mar. 15, 1999, at A1. 
164 Id. 
165 See Kaneira, supra note 1. 
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months while blood collection continued.166 The prison plasma system 
was shut down three times because of safety violations, but it was allowed 
to reopen each time.167 
1. The Recalls 
The largest crisis at the plasma center occurred in 1983, when the FDA 
recalled thirty-eight blood units after it found that twelve inmates,168 ineli-
gible and likely infected with hepatitis, had donated.169 Unfortunately, the 
recall came too late to retrieve all of the tainted blood170—almost 4,000 
vials had already been exported.171 
It was during this emergency that Canada first learned that it was im-
porting inmate plasma.172 Before this time, there were no obvious indica-
tions that the plasma came from a prison; the labels on the product simply 
noted the source as “ADC Plasma Center, Grady, Arkansas.”173 An FDA 
inspection report in Connaught’s possession stated the plasma’s true 
source, but no one at Connaught ever bothered to read the information.174 
A second recall occurred one month after the first, causing the Canadi-
an Red Cross to cancel its contract with Connaught.175 In the letter of 
termination, the assistant national director of blood transfusion stated that 
recent crises left the Canadian Red Cross “with no confidence in the quali-
ty and safety of the material.”176 
After these incidents, the FDA shut down the prison center for over a 
year177 and revoked its license178 in February 1984.179 The violations 
                                                 
166 See Tainted Blood: Poison from the Prisons, supra note 151. 
167 See Harder, supra note 18. 
167 Parker, supra note 155. 
169 Leveritt, supra note 130; KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 391. 
170 See KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 391–93. Though HMA in-
formed Continental Pharma within days of the issue, Continental Pharma decided that the 
risk of contamination was relatively small because the current test results of the donors 
were negative for infection. However, two months after the problem became known, 
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This delay in communication resulted in hundreds fewer units being successfully re-
turned. Id. 
171 Leveritt, supra note 130. 
172 See KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 392. 
173 See id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 393. 
176 Id. 
177 See Dave Komer, Clinton’s Arkansas Blood Deals Yield Horrific Results, THE 
SOUTH END, Feb. 2, 1999. 
2012] THE BLOODY TRUTH 619 
 
found by the FDA included allowing disqualified donors to continue do-
nating, altering records, and improperly storing the collected plasma.180 
HMA was sued over the first recall, and paid $250,000 to settle its share of 
the liability.181 
2. Response 
Perhaps in part because of these events, the FDA issued a national 
warning that inmates have a higher chance of being infected with HIV 
than the general population182—a caution to which the National Correc-
tional Association responded quickly.183 Those responsible for running the 
Cummins Plasma Program chose to disregard these communications and 
succeeded in reopening the program.184 Their intentional blindness per-
sisted even as HMA’s insurance agency refused to continue its cover-
age.185 
Responding to the FDA’s warnings, the Arkansas Department of Cor-
rections requested a report of HMA’s program by the Institute for Law and 
Policy Planning of Berkeley, California (ILPP).186 The response proved 
scathing: the ILPP identified forty areas where HMA completely failed to 
meet the requirements of its contract with the ADC.187 Even worse, HMA 
also violated general professional standards, as it “hired a large number of 
unlicensed, uncertified or legally unqualified medical staff” who were not 
properly supervised.188 The final analysis concluded that: “For HMA, all 
this must be viewed as profit-motivated business decision making, at best. 
                                                                                                                         
178 Parker, supra note 155. 
179 See Leveritt, supra note 130. 
180 Joe Stumpe, Question Remains: Did Prisoner Blood Spread Ills?, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE (Little Rock), Oct. 18, 1998, at A1. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying 
text. 
181 See Stumpe, supra note 180, at A1. 
182 Leveritt, supra note 130. 
183 See id. Shortly after the FDA’s announcement, the National Correctional Associa-
tion wrote an informational bulletin for prisons around the nation to reinforce the mes-
sage, stating that there were concerns about the quality of plasma gathered from a popula-
tion where many were “illicit drug abusers before their incarceration” and “because of the 
close living conditions of large groups of inmates, a high incidence of homosexual activi-
ty is found.” The two actions combined were enough for the majority of prison plasma 
centers: nearly all shut down in the wake of this outcry. Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Parker, supra note 155. 
188 Id. 
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At worst, it calls for further inquiry.”189 ILPP’s sharp words finally pene-
trated the ADC, and in 1986, HMA lost its contract with Cummins pris-
on.190 
3. After HMA 
However, the plasma center did not end with HMA; Pine Bluff 
Biologicals (PBBP) took over and expanded it.191 The new oversight pro-
vided little improvement, however, as an FDA inspector soon found that 
the center possessed inadequate screening measures and recordkeeping.192 
In addition, those in charge of the program were accused of using security 
officers to “recruit” inmates to donate plasma.193 The prison medical di-
rector, John Byus, explained the business plan to a local reporter, stating: 
“We plan to stick with [the plasma program] to the last day .... [t]o the last 
drop we’re able to sell.”194 
A New York group took over the plasma center in 1991, and it contin-
ued to produce and distribute prison plasma until 1994.195 In 1999, Dina 
Tyler, the spokeswoman for Arkansas prisons, admitted that, “some in-
mates were allowed to take part in the program who should not have 
been.”196 She claimed a single clerk caused the errors, and that he charged 
inmates a fee to recertify them for donations.197 
D. How Much Was the Arkansas Plasma Center Worth? 
It was well known in Arkansas that the ADC profited from the plasma 
program;198 the question is, by how much? 
The total profits will probably never be accurately known, because be-
fore the tainted blood scandal occurred, the Arkansas legislature passed a 
                                                 
189 Leveritt, supra note 130. 
190 Parker, supra note 155. 
191 Two additional plasma clinics were opened at this time, including one in the prison 
hospital. Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Blood Money, ARK. TIMES, Sep. 23, 2004, http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/199 
1-blood-money/Content?oid=964677 [hereinafter Blood Money]. 
195 Leveritt, supra note 130; see also Blood Money, supra note 194 (“The last drop 
came in 1994 ....”); Parker, supra note 155. 
196 Deborah Orin, Bad Blood Between Clinton Pal and Canada, N.Y. POST, Feb. 23, 
1999, at 12. 
197 See id. 
198 The contract between HMA and the ADC supposedly guaranteed ADC about fifty 
percent of the total profit. Leveritt, supra note 130. 
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law declaring that the blood plasma program did not need to report its 
earnings to the Arkansas legislature.199 According to vague records from 
the Department of Finance and Administration, from 1982 to 1986 the 
ADC earned $31,721 to $167,259 per year from the plasma program.200 
Records recovered from 1986 provide slightly more insight into the 
potential income of the ADC and the organization running the program: 
by then, Pine Bluff Biological ran the clinic, and it reported collecting 
about 960 units of plasma every week.201 At the time, a unit of plasma was 
worth at least $50 to an international blood broker.202 
Based on these numbers, a conservative estimate of PBBP’s gross 
sales for that fiscal year would come out to $2.5 million.203 PBBP’s con-
tract promised the ADC $5 per unit of plasma collected.204 The resulting 
breakdown may have occurred: “Of PBBP’s $2.5 million in annual gross 
sales, $350,000 went to pay inmates their $7-per-unit fees.205 The state of 
Arkansas collected $249,600 for prison operations. PBBP had gross reve-
nues of $1,896,969.”206 Calculating for inflation, that profit would trans-
late to approximately $3,923,143 in March 2012.207 
                                                 
199 ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-4-803 (West 2010). The exemption is still included in the 
law today, and allowed the prison program to avoid the requirements of Arkansas Code 
section 19-4-802: “State agencies ... shall be required to post all financial transactions of 
cash funds in the [S]tate’s financial management system ....” Id. at § 19-4-802. 
200 Stumpe, supra note 180, at A1. 
201 Leveritt, supra note 130. 
202 See Stumpe, supra note 180, at A1. 
203 See Leveritt, supra note 130. PBBP’s actual profits have never been released and 
are considered proprietary. Id. 
204 Id. 
205 It is important to note here that these $7 fees were not cash fees, but merely 
“script” noted in the prisoner’s book—meaning money that could only be used at the 
prison commissary to pay for products such as cigarettes at inflated commissary prices. 
With this system, PBBP gave prisoners the equivalent of monopoly money, useful only in 
one place. Thus, this estimated number is probably too high. Duda Interview II, supra 
note 22. 
206 Id. (footnote added). 
207 CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data 
/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2012). 
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III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
A. Canada 
1. What Happened to the Tainted Blood in Canada? 
Canada stopped using plasma from its own prison inmates in 1971,208 
based on the recommendation of the Red Cross, because of hepatitis con-
cerns.209 In 1982, however, when HMA was searching for a new, foreign 
buyer, Canada represented one of the few countries in the world that con-
tinued to allow the import of prisoner’s blood and plasma.210 
The consequences of that practice proved dire. It is estimated that over 
1,000 Canadian hemophiliacs were provided with tainted plasma from the 
Cummins prison.211 At least 42,000 Canadians have been infected with 
hepatitis C, and thousands more with the HIV virus, due to tainted plasma, 
some imported from the Cummins prison.212 It is estimated that more than 
7,000 Canadians will die from the contaminated blood.213 
As a result of this scandal, the Canadian Red Cross declared bankrupt-
cy and was removed from the direct collection of blood.214 Further, Cana-
dian authorities launched the Krever Commission (the Commission) in 
1995 to trace the trail of the tainted blood.215 The Commission was the 
first to publicize the likelihood that the Canadian blood supply was con-
taminated by blood donated by U.S. prisoners.216 
The Commission report found that the distribution of the tainted blood 
could have been avoided if better management and oversight had been in 
place.217 The report noted that Connaught Laboratories bought exported 
plasma only because the domestic supply was so small that importing 
blood and plasma became necessary.218 In addition, the report implied that 
Connaught was negligent; it determined that “Connaught decided it was 
                                                 
208 KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 372. 
209 See DePalma, supra note 24, at A4. 
210 See Michele Mandel, Bad Blood: A New Novel Probes Bill Clinton’s Possible Role 
in Canada’s Red Cross Scandal, THE TORONTO SUN, Oct. 4, 1998, at 30. 
211 See Bueckert, supra note 162. 
212 See Parker, supra note 155. 
213 See id. 
214 DePalma, supra note 24, at A4. 
215 Tainted Blood: Poison from the Prisons, supra note 151. 
216 See McKenna, supra note 34, at A16. 
217 See Anne McIlroy, U.S. Prisoners’ Blood Fed Hep-C Infections: Ottawa Docu-
ments Show for the First Time That Government Knew About Risk of Supply, THE GLOBE 
& MAIL (Canada), June 30, 1999, at A1. 
218 See id. 
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‘impracticable’ to inspect all the plasma-collection sites itself, and decided 
to rely instead on FDA reports which it did not, in fact, review.”219 The 
Bureau of Biologics (the Bureau), Canada’s counterpart to the FDA, only 
required that the FDA license the plasma centers.220 Connaught provided 
the Bureau with their list of FDA-approved collection sites, and neither 
party inquired further.221 One Connaught official stated it best during a 
hearing for the Krever Commission when he commented: “Obviously the 
system broke down.”222 
A 1998 Canadian Health Department memo explains that the use of 
the prison blood continued in Canada because the Canadian broker (Con-
tinental-Pharma) was never informed that the blood had a “high probabil-
ity” of being infected with HIV and hepatitis C.223 The memo stated that: 
The use of these blood products in Canada can be attributed to a failure 
by U.S. blood and regulatory authorities to inform a Canadian blood 
broker that blood collected at prisons was no longer safe and as a result 
was no longer being used in the U.S. .... 
... At the time, these blood centres [sic] were still licensed by the U.S. 
Food and Drugs [sic] Administration ... but blood coming from them 
for the most part was exported.224 
Unfortunately, it was not illegal to sell prison blood in the U.S., although 
in practice it no longer occurred.225 Therefore, when Connaught inquired 
about the matter in 1983, it was told only that no regulations on the matter 
existed, not that the U.S. fractionators, in consultation with the FDA, end-
ed the practice226 the year before.227 
In 1999, The Globe and Mail, under access-to-information legislation, 
obtained a briefing note written by Health Minister Allan Rock that sug-
gested the Arkansas prison blood was responsible for at least some Cana-
dians becoming infected with hepatitis C. The document explained: 
“Plasma from such high-risk populations may indeed have contributed to 
the transmission of blood diseases such as AIDS and hepatitis C.”228 
                                                 
219 Tainted Blood: Poison from the Prisons, supra note 151. 
220 KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 391. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Bueckert, supra note 162. 
224 Id. 
225 See KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 377. 
226 Id. at 398. 
227 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
228 McIlroy, supra note 217, at A1. 
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In 2001, documents from Health Canada, the company responsible for 
running the country’s health system, proved that the Canadian Red Cross 
did distribute plasma from U.S. prison inmates.229 The documents admit-
ted that “risky” blood from the Arkansas prison was used and that “a sig-
nificant amount of the product made from the potentially HIV-infected 
blood was not retrieved and it was learned that it had already been 
used.”230 Evidence brought to light in 2003 showed that the Arkansas 
prison continued to sell—and Canada continued to receive—the inmates’ 
blood long after the prison had been cited for multiple safety and health 
violations, including approving donors who were infected with HIV and 
hepatitis C.231 
The Canadian government settled a class action lawsuit brought by 
Canadian hemophiliacs for $1.118 billion in 1999.232 This settlement only 
covered those infected between 1986 and 1990.233 The group, led by plain-
tiff Michael McCarthy, vice president of the Canadian Hemophilia Socie-
ty, also filed a suit against Continental Pharma.234 
In 1999, a group of Canadian hemophiliacs declared their intent to sue 
the responsible parties in America for $5 billion.235 In 2001, the Canadian 
Hemophilia Society announced further plans: they hoped to sue Arkansas, 
Louisiana, the businesses that participated in the sale and export of prison 
plasma, and the FDA.236 The two companies they planned to name in the 
lawsuit were Health Management Associates in Arkansas and Community 
Plasma Center in Louisiana.237 
Despite the announcement, the lawsuit was never filed.238 McCarthy, 
also piloting this effort, reported that “numerous obstacles ... delayed the 
filing—including the inability to get legal help from respected blood liti-
gators south of the [U.S.-Canadian] border.”239 
As of 2006, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had been in-
vestigating the blood scandal for five years, and despite supposedly con-
                                                 
229 See Harder, supra note 18. 
230 See id. 
231 See Canadian Press, supra note 153, at D15; see also discussion supra Part II.B. 
232 See Canada Proposes $1.1 Billion Settlement in HCV Lawsuit, REUTERS HEALTH 
MEDICAL NEWS, June 18, 1999 (Legal) [hereinafter Canada Proposes $1.1 Billion Set-
tlement]. 
233 See id. 
234 See id. 
235 Dunphy, supra note 158, at A1. 
236 See Harder, supra note 18. 
237 See Canada Proposes $1.1 Billion Settlement, supra note 232. 
238 See Harder, supra note 18. 
239 Id. 
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templating charging those in the United States with criminal negligence,240 
the only charges filed thus far have been against the Red Cross and the 
Federal Bureau of Biologics.241 One of the factors the probe is focused on 
is “the importation of tainted blood from prisoners in Arkansas, brought 
into Canada by a Montreal-based blood broker and used by Canadian 
hemophiliacs. The same tainted blood product was exported around the 
world by the Canadian broker.”242 
2. Canadian Response 
In 2006, the Canadian government finally compensated victims of 
Canada’s tainted blood scandal who contracted hepatitis C and were not 
included in previous settlements, including those claiming to have been 
infected by plasma from Cummins prison.243 More than 5,000 victims who 
were given contaminated blood and blood products before 1986 and after 
1990 will receive compensation under the plan.244 The previous settlement 
in 1998 only included those infected between 1986 and 1990, because the 
government claimed it could not have prevented contamination before 
1986; however, evidence of screening techniques introduced prior to 1986 
weakened the government’s position.245 
Under the new agreement, the government set aside nearly $1 billion 
to provide compensation, thus matching the compensation for those in-
fected between 1986 and 1990.246 Further, those who contracted the dis-
ease through tainted blood before 1986 and after 1990 will now receive 
between $1,000 and $300,000.247 
                                                 
240 Dunphy, supra note 158, at A1. 
241 See Laura Cudworth, Stuff Movies Are Made of: Tainted Blood Scandal to Be 
Turned into Film, STRATFORD BEACON-HERALD (Ontario), Jan. 18, 2006, at 1. 
242 Tim Harper, Criminal Charges Likely End to Tainted Blood Probe, HAMILTON 
SPECTATOR (Ontario), Nov. 15, 1999, at C14. 
243 See Op-Ed., Long Time Coming, THE SIMCOE REFORMER (Ontario), Aug. 2, 2006, 
at 4. 
244 See id. 
245 See id. 
246 See id. 
247 See id. 
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B. Britain 
1. What Happened to the Tainted Blood in Britain? 
Britain outlawed paid donations of blood earlier than the United States 
because the British government believed that paying would attract the 
wrong type of donor.248 Britain also did not permit collection of prisoners’ 
blood, both because the government considered it exploitive and because 
it recognized earlier than the United States that such blood was more like-
ly to be contaminated.249 However, Britain, like Canada, continued to 
purchase blood from international vendors, like the United States, 250 and 
this allowed tainted blood to poison thousands of British citizens.251 Taint-
ed blood that was sold to Britain in the 1980s—including blood products 
from the Arkansas prisons—resulted in what Lord Robert Winston called 
“the worst treatment disaster in the history of the NHS.”252 Most of the 
victims believed the blood and clotting factors they were using came from 
British donors; the possibility the blood might have been imported did not 
even occur to them, much less the prospect that it might not meet British 
health standards.253 
This disaster left 4,670 British hemophiliacs infected with hepatitis C, 
and 1,243 of those were also infected with HIV.254 Nearly 2,000 have 
died, and many more need treatment.255 The diseases have continued to 
spread to partners and children.256 The outcry surrounding this tragedy 
resulted in a two-year private report, the Archer Inquiry (the Inquiry),257 
released in February 2009. The Inquiry found that “Britain was slow to 
                                                 
248 See Birrell, supra note 32. 
249 See Leveritt, supra note 130. 
250 See ARCHER INQUIRY, supra note 107, at 24 (describing the negotiations between 
British pharmacists and commercial suppliers—primarily American suppliers). 
251 See Birrell, supra note 32. 
252 Id. 
253 See Leveritt, supra note 130. 
254 See Birrell, supra note 32. 
255 See ARCHER INQUIRY, supra note 107, at 5. 
256 See Birrell, supra note 32. 
257 The Independent Public Inquiry on NHS Supplied Contaminated Blood and Blood 
Products. This independent inquiry was not financed in any way by the English govern-
ment. ARCHER INQUIRY, supra note 107, at 6–7. Its mission statement is: “To investigate 
the circumstances surrounding the supply to patients of contaminated NHS blood and 
blood products; its consequences for the haemophilia [sic] community and others afflict-
ed; and suggest further steps to address both their problems and needs and those of be-
reaved families.” Id. at 7. 
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react to the problems as they emerged[,] and said commercial interests 
were put ahead of safety.”258 It ultimately determined that: 
[A] significant burden of responsibility [for tainted blood provided to 
British hemophiliacs] rests on American suppliers of Factor VIII con-
centrate. Long after alarms had been sounded about the risks of obtain-
ing paid-for blood donations from communities with an increased inci-
dence of relevant infections, such as prison inmates, this practice 
continued. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that commercial inter-
ests took precedence over public health concerns.259 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine exactly where all the blood 
came from, and how much of it might have come from the United States 
or the Arkansas prison. A significant part of this uncertainty stems from 
the fact that during the 1990s many of the records keeping track of the 
imports and sales of blood were shredded.260 The British Haemophilia 
Society has sought an inquiry into the plasma transactions, specifically for 
the Factor VIII sent from the Arkansas prisons, but their requests have yet 
to be addressed.261 According to the Communications Manager of the 
Hemophiliac Society, “[w]e know of three UK cases of HIV that can be 
directly traced back to Arkansas prison blood.”262 By October 2010, an 
estimated 1,800 out of the 4,800 British hemophiliacs poisoned by tainted 
blood products had died,263 and this number certainly increased over the 
past two years. 
2. English Response 
The English government has been struggling to come to a settlement 
for the sufferers of contaminated blood and blood products. In October 
2010, however, the government decided that, given spending costs and the 
current financial crisis, it would be too expensive to offer a compensation 
package similar to that of Ireland, where those infected with hepatitis C 
were each given £750,000 after a similar inquiry in 1991.264 Instead, it 
                                                 
258 Birrell, supra note 32. 
259 ARCHER INQUIRY, supra note 107, at 105. 
260 The British Department of Health ordered an inquiry into the destruction of the 
documents in 2000, but failed to publish its findings. When reporters from the BBC 
requested the findings in 2007, they were informed that the Prime Minister ordered them 
withheld. See Leveritt, supra note 130. 
261 See id. 
262 Id. 
263 14 Oct. 2010, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2010) 555 (U.K.). 
264 See generally id. at 521. 
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offered only to provide a “rapid, but limited, review into the cases of those 
infected with hepatitis C.”265 
3. Scottish Response 
In Glasgow, hemophiliacs who believe they were infected by the Ar-
kansas prison plasma have repeatedly asked for a public inquiry into the 
matter.266 The hemophiliacs believe that the inmates were allowed to con-
tinue donating even though authorities knew they were infected with hepa-
titis C and HIV. They have even threatened to call former President Bill 
Clinton, Governor of Arkansas at the time of the scandal, to the witness 
stand.267 
According to the Public Health Minister, victims have received com-
pensation of up to £45,000, and therefore a public inquiry would not pro-
vide “any real benefit.”268 The hemophiliacs have already taken legal 
action against the Lord Advocate and the Health Minister.269 
IV. THE LAWSUIT 
A. Why Did the Victims Fail to File Suit Against the Responsible American 
Parties? 
1. In General 
No clear answer exists as to why the victims of the Arkansas prison 
plasma scandal failed to sue the allegedly responsible parties, especially 
because the Canadian Hemophilia Society planned to do so as early as 
1999.270 As of that date, the Canadian victims also stated their desire to 
“seek a full investigation by the U.S. [J]ustice [D]epartment to determine 
                                                 
265 Birrell, supra note 32. 
266 See Matt Dickinson, Infected Blood Victims Protest at Clinton Visit; Transfusions 
Came from Former President’s Home State, EXPRESS NEWSPAPERS (Scotland), May 11, 
2006, at 13. 
267 Clinton’s Scottish Court Warning, DAILY RECORD (Scotland), Oct. 31, 2005, at 21. 
268 Dickinson, supra note 266, at 13. 
269 See Clinton’s Scottish Court Warning, supra note 267. 
270 Tim Harper, Tainted Blood Victims Seek U.S. Retribution, THE TORONTO STAR, 
Feb. 22, 1999 (News) (“The Canadian hemophiliacs ... plan to seek American retribution 
for the tainted blood collected from U.S. prisoners and exported to [Canada]. They will 
launch a lawsuit against the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the state of 
Arkansas, and possibly Clinton, the Arkansas governor while Health Management Asso-
ciates collected plasma from inmates of Cummins Prison.”). Id. The RCMP supposedly 
began talks with the FBI and the U.S. Justice Department. Id. 
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how inmates ... continued to give dirty blood which was exported to Can-
ada and then to other countries.”271 
Victims in Britain felt angry enough to search through the records on 
their own until they determined that they did receive plasma from the 
Cummins prison.272 In Canada, victims threatened to subpoena prominent 
government officials to explain their actions.273 
So why did such a suit never materialize? The unfortunate truth is 
probably because the United States courts have demonstrated a general 
distaste for finding liability for contaminated blood defendants, and often 
dismiss the cases on summary judgment.274 Courts have been especially 
reluctant to find liability in cases where hepatitis C was the transmitted 
disease for two major reasons: “(1) the judicial fear that to impose such 
liability would severely restrict the availability of blood, and (2) the ab-
sence of any reliable way to detect hepatitis-carrying blood.”275 
In addition to this initial reluctance, the plaintiffs would face basic 
procedural limitations.276 Precedent cases show that it has been historically 
difficult to procure a class action certification approved for groups of 
hemophiliacs suing the blood industry.277 Moreover, forty-eight out of 
                                                 
271 Id. The victims also believed they had the legal standing to do so. As the foreign 
affairs spokesperson announced: “Canadians are free to pursue alleged wrongs perpetrat-
ed by foreign governments.” Id. 
272 See Leveritt, supra note 130. 
273 Tainted Blood: Poison from the Prisons, supra note 151. 
274 See, e.g., Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 851 F.2d 437, 438–39 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 
Smythe v. Am. Red Cross Blood Serv., 797 F. Supp. 147, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Howell 
v. Spokane & Inland Blood Bank, 785 P.2d 815, 824 (Wash. 1990). 
275 37 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 1 (1984). 
276 Such as the relevant statute of limitations passing. See, e.g., In re Factor VIII or IX 
Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., No. Civ. A. 94-0382, 2000 WL 282787, at *7 (E.D. La. 
Mar. 14, 2000). 
277 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that class certification was inappropriate because such actions might bankrupt 
the industry, or force them into blackmail settlements). This has also been true to a lesser 
extent in Canada; a class action suit filed against the Canadian Red Cross and the Cana-
dian Government by about 1,000 hemophiliacs infected with HIV was thrown out be-
cause the judge determined that, “lawsuits involving contaminated blood should be filed 
individually.” Canada Drops Blood Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, at 3. However, 
some courts have allowed consolidation and centralization of claims under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407 (meaning that claims with similar bases in fact can be tried at a central location 
for convenience and efficiency purposes, though the defendants are not actually being 
tried together). See, e.g., In re “Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods.” Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2004); In re “Factor VIII or IX Concentrate 
Blood Prods.” Prod. Liab. Litig., 853 F. Supp. 454, 455–56 (J.P.M.L. 1993). 
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fifty states278 have passed blood shield laws,279 limiting the available caus-
es of action against those in the industry.280 
B. Hypothetical Negligence Case 
1. The Hypothetical 
If the Canadian Hemophilia Society had brought suit against HMA 
and Pine Bluff Biologicals,281 like most of the plaintiffs in the tainted 
blood litigation thus far in the United States, the victims of the Arkansas 
blood scandal probably would not have prevailed,282 even if all the facts 
alleged were true,283 and even though the distributed blood products were 
not “unavoidably unsafe.”284 
This is the unfortunate reality even when considering the horrific con-
ditions purported to exist at the prison plasma center. At any plasma center 
during this period, it is possible that a few cases of blood tainted with 
hepatitis C were inevitable, especially given the fact that the causative 
agent of the disease was not known at the time,285 and that no accurate test 
to identify it existed.286 But the situation at the Cummins plasma center 
was not inevitable. The fact that the disease infecting the recipients was 
                                                 
278 Including Arkansas. McKenna, supra note 34, at A16. 
279 Dunphy, supra note 158, at A1. 
280 Id. (“An American group seeking compensation for contracting HIV and hepatitis 
C from tainted blood has had no success in seven years of court action.”). 
281 Assuming the relevant statute of limitations had not run and that venue, jurisdic-
tion, class certification, et cetera were correct. 
282 Assuming the evidence proved the poor conditions at the prison and the knowledge 
of the prison administration, as explored supra notes 274–75 and accompanying text. 
283 See Mandel, supra note 210, at 30. The Krever Commission Report at least con-
firms that the basic facts of the Cummins Plasma Program and the distribution of the 
blood products to Canada are correct. Id. 
284 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). The concept of “un-
avoidably unsafe” is addressed in § 402A comment k, which provides an exception to 
strict liability for products deemed to meet the standard of “products which, in the present 
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and 
ordinary use.” Id. The blood products here were not “avoidably unsafe” because, under 
the state of human knowledge at the time, it was well known that the use of prisoners’ 
blood and the unsanitary conditions at Cummins prison made contamination more likely, 
but the plasma was distributed anyway. 
285 See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 2 (1984) (identifying hepatitis C only as 
“non-A, non-B”). 
286 Dorney, supra note 19, at 169 (noting that even the best hepatitis C tests were only 
twenty-five to thirty percent effective). 
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unknown and unpreventable at the time287 does not change the truth: those 
in charge of monitoring the program either knew or should have known 
that the conditions at the prison provided a breeding ground for diseased 
product. They were aware of the warnings from the FDA against using 
prisoners’ blood and of an established industry custom against using plas-
ma from paid donors, but they disregarded these red flags and distributed 
it anyway,288 causing the spread of needless disease and death in order to 
secure a profit.289 
Despite this apparent negligence, despite the findings of the Krever 
Commission, and despite the responses of the Canadian and British gov-
ernments showing that it is likely that this tainted plasma was distributed 
to and sickened their populations, a legal remedy for victims in this matter 
could not be easily obtained. Due to the extreme difficulty of proving 
causation in a tainted blood product case,290 unless the plaintiffs could 
prove that a vial of tainted blood from Cummins prison directly caused 
their hepatitis C, a negligence suit against the responsible parties would 
fail,291 given the current state of litigation against the blood industry in 
America.292 
2. Why Negligence? 
Why bring a negligence suit then, if it is likely to fail? The explanation 
is that plaintiffs have a slightly higher chance of prevailing in a negligence 
action against a blood product supplier than they do in winning a strict 
liability293 or breach of implied warranty294 action.295 Negligence is effec-
                                                 
287 But see Westfall, supra note 88, at 1123 (arguing that the risk of blood products 
should not have been inevitable because it could have been reduced by decreasing the 
pooling and ending the use of high-risk donors). 
288 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
289 See discussion supra Part II.D. 
290 See Miller, supra note 31, at 473. 
291 See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1094 (2000) (“Negligence claims for 
blood products ... were practically impossible for plaintiffs to win.”). 
292 See Rueda, supra note 68, at 424 (explaining that plaintiffs in tainted blood litiga-
tion have a very small chance of prevailing). 
293 Strict liability is a tort theory that allows a plaintiff to recover for damages caused 
by a defective product, even if the seller of the product took all reasonable precautions in 
manufacturing the product. This cause of action is codified in § 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. See Miller, supra note 31, at 482–83. Very few cases have allowed 
strict liability in blood-supply cases, and then only when the court determined that the 
blood created an unreasonable risk of harm to others. See, e.g., DeBattista v. Argonaut-
Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26, 32 (La. 1981). 
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tively the only possible cause of action against blood product producers 
because of the enactment of blood shield laws across the United States.296 
As one author described the current legal climate: 
Today, the provider of a virally contaminated unit of whole blood, 
blood component, or blood derivative bears virtually no liability to the 
injured recipient of the transfusion. First, the transfusion of blood prod-
ucts is not the sale of goods; therefore, the implied warranties of Article 
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) do not attach. Second, bar-
ring negligence, blood products that are virally contaminated are not 
legally defective and unreasonably dangerous, thereby avoiding any 
provider liability under a theory of strict liability in tort. This unique 
legal protection of blood products and providers arises by operation of 
law as stated in each state’s blood shield statute.297 
Blood shield laws in the United States codify the rule that blood and 
blood derivatives are not considered “products” under strict products lia-
bility298 and implied warranty, mainly out of concern that the risks cannot 
be completely eradicated when there are so many possibilities for contam-
ination.299 Thus, rather than simply asserting a strict liability or breach of 
implied warranty cause of action,300 a tainted blood or plasma victim must 
face the higher burden of proving the elements of a negligence claim to 
                                                                                                                         
294 Implied warranty is a contract theory defined and controlled by the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Article 2. See Miller, supra note 31, at 482. Though causes of action 
for breach of implied warranty generally fail, they have occasionally been successful if 
the state’s blood shield statute provided an exception. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-
3702 (West 2011) (restrictions on liability do not apply to suppliers who use paid donors 
or who profit); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (West 2011) (restrictions on liability 
do not apply if the donor was paid); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-33-102 (West 2009) (re-
strictions on liability do not apply to a hospital if blood came from a source in which the 
hospital held a financial interest). 
295 See Conk, supra note 291, at 1094. 
296 See, e.g., Miles Labs. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1125 (Md. 1989) (effectively hold-
ing that only a negligence cause of action could be brought against the defendant blood 
bank). 
297 Shu-Acquaye & Innet, supra note 58, at 33 (footnotes omitted). 
298 See Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding 
that the legislature’s enactment of a blood shield statute demonstrated their intent to end 
strict liability for the blood industry). 
299 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC 
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 295 (2000). 
300 See id. (“To establish negligence, plaintiffs must show that the defendants either 
knew or should have known of the risk of transmitting a deadly virus through the sale of 
factor concentrate.”). 
2012] THE BLOODY TRUTH 633 
 
prevail, because legislatures and courts have both decided to prohibit or 
strongly limit the application of no-fault liability in these situations.301 
Under the burden of negligence, the plaintiffs would need to show that 
the injury they suffered resulted because HMA and Pine Bluff Biologicals 
failed to use reasonable care in their collection and distribution of the 
blood products, and that this failure caused the victims to contract the 
disease.302 
3. Arkansas’ Blood Shield Law 
Arkansas’ blood shield law is codified in section 20-9-802 of the Ar-
kansas Code. It only permits negligence and willful misconduct causes of 
action against those involved in the manufacture, sale and transfer of 
blood or blood products,303 stating: 
No physician, surgeon, hospital, blood bank, tissue bank, or other per-
son or entity who donates, obtains, prepares, transplants, injects, trans-
fuses, or otherwise transfers or who assists or participates in obtaining, 
preparing, transplanting, injecting, transfusing, or transferring any tis-
sue, organ, blood, or component thereof from one (1) or more human 
beings, living or dead, to another human being, shall be liable as the re-
sult of the activity, except that each such person or entity shall remain 
liable for negligence or willful misconduct only.304 
Section 20-9-801 clarifies the public policy reasons behind the blood 
shield statute, explaining that this shield is necessary to ensure the availa-
bility of scientific knowledge and that, by preventing strict liability causes 
of action (which might inhibit such development), the State is better able 
to promote the health and welfare of its citizens.305 In addition, Arkansas 
law precludes actions under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
for breach of warranty in cases of blood services.306 
                                                 
301 See Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to “No Cause” Liability in Blood 
Products Litigation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 117 (1995). 
302 See Feldman, supra note 43, at 671. This is discussed in a preliminary version of 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which states: “A seller of human blood products or 
human tissue is subject to liability for harm to persons caused by product defects [only] 
if, at the time of sale, the seller failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining, processing 
or selling the blood product or tissue.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 4B (Preliminary Draft No. 2 1994). 
303 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-802 (West 2010). 
304 Id. 
305 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-801. 
306 See Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857, 859 (8th Cir. 1989) (“The implied 
warranties of the Uniform Commercial Code therefore do not apply to blood ....”). 
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4. Establishing the Elements 
In order to prove negligence, the plaintiffs would need to show: (1) 
that they were owed a legal duty by the responsible parties, (2) that such 
duty was breached, (3) that the breach was the proximate cause of their 
injury, and (4) that they suffered damage.307 
a. Duty 
The first concern that the plaintiffs in such a case would need to prove 
is that those responsible for the conditions at the plasma center owed them 
a duty308 of care.309 The victims would have to address who, precisely, 
owed them a duty. Given HMA’s dissolution in 1986, it would make the 
most sense for the plaintiffs to sue those in charge of HMA and Pine Bluff 
Biologicals310 as individuals311 if they hoped to achieve a monetary victo-
ry.312 
The contract between PBBP and the ADC provided that, for the 
ADC’s portion of the earnings, PBBP could use the plasma center and any 
utilities without cost, and could have access to inmates for donations and 
occasional staffing of the center.313 In exchange, PBBP promised to “as-
sume responsibility/liability for all plasma product(s) produced.”314 It is 
likely that a similar contract bound the ADC and HMA.315 
Based on legal precedent, it is clearly true that blood product distribu-
tors owe a duty of care to the recipients of the blood product.316 This duty, 
                                                 
307 Endres v. Endres, 968 A.2d 336, 340 (Vt. 2008). 
308 See W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (5th ed. 
1984) (“‘[D]uty’ is ... an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy 
which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.”). 
309 37 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 5 (1984). 
310 This is based on the assumption that these defendants are under the jurisdiction of 
the court. Constitutionally, the plaintiffs cannot sue the state of Arkansas or the Arkansas 
Board of Corrections without the state consenting, because “the Eleventh Amendment 
prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits by private parties against States and their 
agencies.” Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (holding that a federal court’s injunc-
tion against the Alabama Board of Corrections was unconstitutional). 
311 For the purposes of this Note, these individuals will continue to be collectively re-
ferred to as HMA. 
312 Though it would probably be more of a moral victory than a monetary victory, as it 
is unlikely that individual defendants could provide much compensation. 
313 Leveritt, supra note 130. 
314 Id. 
315 No evidence was available to confirm or deny this, so for the purposes of the hypo-
thetical, it will be assumed true. 
316 Dorney, supra note 19, at 157. 
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stated generally, is to collect the commodity in a non-negligent manner.317 
“Non-negligent manner” means that the defendant did not and should not 
have foreseen that his actions might harm another.318 A major part of this 
determination is a court’s inquiry into what was or should have been 
known by the scientific community and the blood industry at the time.319 
Courts differ in the standard of care they believe the blood industry 
should adhere to: the ordinary standard or the professional standard.320 On 
one side, industry proponents contend that blood and plasma centers are 
service providers selling an inherently dangerous product. They argue, 
therefore, that the producers should be held to a professional standard, out 
of concern that the industry will otherwise suffer, because no one will 
want to work in it and face such a high likelihood of liability. A New Jer-
sey Court of Appeals, meanwhile, clearly explained the opposing side’s 
position, stating: 
[I]f the blood bank industry is allowed to establish its own custom or 
practice of testing for the presence of an infectious disease, then no 
matter how unreasonable such standard might be by ordinary judgment, 
all members of the blood bank industry would be insulated from liabil-
ity as long as they conformed their practice to the industry’s self-
established norm. This result is not tolerable in our system of justice.321 
Even now, jurisdictions are greatly divided on this question.322 For exam-
ple, the court in Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services found that, as 
                                                 
317 Id. 
318 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 cmt. b (1965). 
319 Dana J. Finberg, Note, Blood Bank and Blood Products Manufacturer Liability in 
Transfusion-Related AIDS Cases, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 519, 534 (1992). 
320 If held to a professional standard of care, the plaintiffs in this case must prove that 
the conditions that HMA and PBBP allowed in the prison did not meet the contemporary 
industry-wide custom. See, e.g., Osborn v. Irwin Mem’l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 
120–21 (Ct. App. 1992). Professional standards in this context would include: “[S]tatutes, 
such as blood bank acts and communicable disease acts; regulations, such as those of the 
Food and Drug Administration; licensure examination requirements; internal rules, by-
laws and regulations of organizations, such as the AABB; professional publications and 
learned treatises; conduct or standards of like organizations; and expert testimony.” R. Jo 
Reser & Barbara A. Radnofsky, New Wave of Tainted Blood Litigation: Hepatitis C 
Liability Issues, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 306, 309 (2000). 
321 Estate of Elkerson v. N.J. Blood Ctr., 776 A.2d 244, 250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). 
322 For a comprehensive discussion of industry versus a general standard of care and 
its implications for jury considerations, see generally Reser & Radnofsky, supra note 
320, at 307–08 (“While compliance with industry standards has not allowed defendants 
an out in litigation, the failure to comply with such standards usually proves fatal.”). 
636 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:597 
 
a service provider, the Red Cross should be held to a professional stand-
ard;323 however, in an Arkansas case, Kirkendall v. Harbor Insurance 
Company, the court determined that complying with industry standards 
could be evidence of what ought to be done, but that it was not conclu-
sive.324 Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court held that meeting industry 
standard was permitted as evidence of non-negligence, but found that the 
plaintiff must be given the opportunity to prove the standards of the entire 
industry negligent.325 
Given the Eighth Circuit court’s decision in Kirkendall, it is likely that 
the court would hold HMA and PBBP to the ordinary standard of care; 
however, as discussed below, the plasma center administrators’ negligence 
was great enough to breach either standard. In conclusion, it is clear that 
HMA and PBBP owed the recipients of the plasma a duty of care, whether 
ordinary or professional. 
b. Breach 
In order to breach their duty, the defendants in this case would need to 
have failed to meet the required standard of care.326 
Even if judged by the standards of the industry, HMA and PBBP be-
haved negligently in continuing the prison plasma center long after such 
programs were widely discontinued.327 By the end of 1982, given the FDA 
recommendations, all of the major American fractionators had stopped 
collecting donations from paid donors, and it was well known in the indus-
try that prison blood was significantly riskier than the blood of the majori-
ty of the population.328 
Further, the hypothetical Arkansas case can be distinguished from a 
case such as Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, an important California plasma 
transfusion case, in which the court determined that even though the de-
                                                 
323 Doe v. Am. Red Cross Blood Serv., 377 S.E.2d 323, 326 (S.C. 1989) (holding that 
the plaintiff must prove that the Red Cross failed to meet industry standards). 
324 See Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857, 860–61 (8th Cir. 1989). Though 
appealed to the Eighth Circuit, this case involved events that occurred in Arkansas, and 
was originally tried in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkan-
sas. See id. at 859. 
325 United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 524–26 (Colo. 1992). But see 
Brown v. United Blood Servs., 858 P.2d 391, 396 (Nev. 1993) (rejecting Quintana as an 
outlier). 
326 See Miller, supra note 31, at 473. 
327 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Vose, 53 F.3d 327 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that the Rhode Island 
Adult Correctional Institutions ended their prison blood donation program in 1983). 
328 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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fendant intentionally utilized and paid a slum population for their dona-
tions, such practice was not negligent because of an insufficiency of vol-
unteer blood donors.329 The major difference is that the defendant in Fogo 
possessed a different level of knowledge than the administrators at Cum-
mins: the Fogo decision came down in 1977, five years before the FDA 
recommended ending the use of paid donors.330 Moreover, though the 
defendants in Fogo permitted donations from persons who were “unclean, 
elderly, transients, alcoholics and otherwise debilitated,”331 no evidence 
presented indicated the conditions at the plasma center themselves were 
dirty and corrupt.332 
In contrast, HMA and PBBP did not meet industry standards given the 
supposed conditions of the plasma program. This was not a situation in 
which the plasma service providers simply failed to treat blood to prevent 
hepatitis,333 or failed to screen one particular donor.334 Instead, the prison-
ers allegedly ran the plasma center themselves, and there are eyewitness 
accounts and FDA documentation of over-bleeding, bleeding prisoners 
known to be disqualified donors, a filthy environment, and incidents when 
plasma was incorrectly stored but still distributed.335 As one Nevada court 
held, a supplier of blood can be found liable if there is proof that measures 
taken by the supplier “to screen donors and eliminate contaminated blood 
fell below the standards promulgated and practiced by the industry.”336 
This was certainly the case at the Cummins Plasma Center. 
Finally, HMA and PBBP breached their duty of care by failing to fol-
low the FDA’s recommendations to end the use of blood from paid do-
nors. Even though this was a “recommendation” rather than a regulation, a 
1989 Arkansas circuit court decision found that an FDA recommendation 
that blood suppliers begin testing blood as soon as the required supplies 
became available imposed a duty on them to do so immediately.337 
Negligence can be shown by evidence of the defendant’s actual or 
constructive knowledge of the risk his behavior entails,338 and HMA and 
PBBP were given repeated warnings over the conditions at the plasma 
                                                 
329 See generally Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (Ct. App. 1977). 
330 Id. 
331 Id. at 426–27. 
332 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
333 See Fogo, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 420. 
334 See, e.g., United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 517 (Colo. 1992) (deter-
mining that the donor to the blood bank was a homosexual infected with HIV). 
335 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
336 Brown v. United Blood Servs., 858 P.2d 391, 396 (Nev. 1993). 
337 See Kirkendall v. Harbor Ins. Co., 887 F.2d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 1989). 
338 See Endres v. Endres, 968 A.2d 336, 341 (Vt. 2008). 
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center, including through the recall of their product, revocation of their 
license by the FDA, warnings about the risks of prison blood from the 
FDA and the National Correctional Association, and the end of the prison 
plasma collection system in virtually every other state.339 
Based on the analysis above, HMA and PBBP breached their duty of 
care to those who received blood from the prison. 
c. Causation 
It is extremely challenging, if not impossible, to prove causation in 
blood and plasma liability cases.340 This frustration occurs because of the 
difficulty in showing with absolute certainty the source of a contaminated 
blood product (especially when hemophiliacs inject themselves so fre-
quently341) and in establishing that one particular vial resulted in the 
transmission of the disease.342 To make matters more complicated, during 
the relevant years at issue for this hypothetical, Connaught purchased 
plasma not only from the Cummins prison, but also from San Francisco, 
where the blood bank confirmed several cases of AIDS343 and from where 
the victims might easily have contracted hepatitis C. 
In negligence cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving causa-
tion.344 The defendant’s breach of duty must be the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury, meaning that the defendant’s negligence must have 
caused the injury and that the law would require the defendant to be re-
sponsible for his conduct.345 The plaintiff must be able to show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that one specific defendant caused the harm. 
Courts virtually never permit plaintiffs to use either market share liabil-
ity346 or alternative liability theory,347 either of which would ease the chal-
                                                 
339 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
340 Patricia Kussmann, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Blood 
Shield Statutes, 75 A.L.R. 5th 229 (2000). 
341 In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 484 F.3d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
342 See, e.g., Dunphy, supra note 158, at A1. 
343 Stumpe, supra note 180, at A1. 
344 In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., No. Civ. A. 94-0382, 2000 
WL 282787, at *10 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 2000). 
345 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 351–53 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing 
the limitations of proximate cause) (“The right to recover damages rests on additional 
considerations. The plaintiff’s rights must be injured, and this injury must be caused by 
the negligence.”). 
346 Market share liability is a theory of liability utilized by plaintiffs in cases where 
they were injured by a generic, fungible product that is inherently harmful, but they 
cannot conclusively determine which company in an industry caused their injury. In these 
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lenge of proving causation, because both allow the plaintiff to bring suit 
against multiple parties when it is clear that one of the defendants was 
negligent, but determining which one is impossible. For example, in the 
hypothetical discussed here, two different administrators—HMA and 
PBBP—both ran the prison plasma center. If a victim somehow managed 
to prove that they received tainted plasma from the ADC during the year 
when the two defendants overlapped, a court accepting the market share 
liability concept would hold both HMA and PBBP liable.348 Precedents 
from the majority of tainted blood litigation in the United States,349 how-
ever, suggest that unless the victim could decisively show which adminis-
trator distributed the contaminated blood product, the court would instead 
hold neither liable. 
The court in In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Liti-
gation addressed the problem of causation, agreeing with the plaintiffs that 
the correct test for causation was the “substantial factor” test, but finding 
that plaintiffs must prove that the defendant’s negligence was the cause-in-
fact of the diseases they contracted.350 Even though the plaintiff in In re 
                                                                                                                         
cases, the court has allowed any producer of the product to be liable for its portion of the 
market share at the relevant time, unless it can prove it was not the manufacturer of the 
product. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 932, 936-37 (Cal. 1980). However, courts 
have generally been unwilling to extend market share liability to blood product litigation, 
because they believe Factor VIII is not a generic, identical, fungible, and inherently 
dangerous product that would meet the Sindell criteria. See, e.g., King v. Cutter Labs., 
685 So. 2d 1358, 1359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Doe v. Cutter Biological, 852 F. Supp. 
909, 913 (D. Idaho 1994). 
347 The courts have also proven unwilling to extend the theory of alternative liability 
to blood product litigation. Alternative liability arises when two defendants acted in a 
simultaneous or similarly tortious manner and caused harm, but the plaintiffs cannot 
identify the actual tortfeasor who caused their injury. In order to meet the requirements of 
alternative liability, all possible tortfeasors must be before the court. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) cmt. f. (1965). See, e.g., Spencer v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 163 
F. Supp. 2d 74, 79 (D. Mass. 2001); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 178 F. 
Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (S.D. Iowa 2001), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
380 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 2004). 
348 See, e.g., Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 281, 286 (Fla. 1990) (holding 
that a DES-plaintiff could recover from the defendants based on market share liability, 
because she could not determine which defendant caused the harm); McCormack v. 
Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D. Mass. 1985) (“[T]he magnitude of the physi-
cal and psychological injuries which are at issue in DES cases counsels toward permitting 
a remedy under some form of a market-share theory of liability.”). 
349 Hawaii proves to be the exception: in one case the court permitted the plaintiffs in 
Factor VIII litigation to use market share liability. See Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 
823 P.2d 717, 729 (Haw. 1991). 
350 In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., No. Civ. A. 94-0382, 2000 
WL 282787, at *10 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 2000). 
640 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:597 
 
Factor VIII kept logs of his Factor VIII infusions (including the manufac-
turers’ details), the court found this evidence insufficient to conclusively 
prove which batch caused his HIV infection.351 
Often, a plaintiff involved in tainted blood litigation can prove only 
that it is likely that he contracted the disease from one provider,352 but the 
general response has been that a strong likelihood of causation is not suffi-
cient to prove causation.353 The plaintiff is required to show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendant’s negligence directly caused his 
injury.354 
Proving this element is so problematic that even the three plaintiffs in 
Britain who claimed they could trace their infection directly back to the 
Arkansas prison would face enormous difficulties in establishing causa-
tion.355 Given the time it takes for HIV356 and hepatitis C to manifest after 
infection,357 it is nearly impossible to prove that one particular vial caused 
the disease for a hemophiliac plaintiff, because the time of infection can-
not be confirmed.358 In the case of Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., even 
though the named defendants held between 88 and 94.5% of the market 
share over the years when the plaintiff used Factor VIII,359 and the date of 
the plaintiff’s infection could be pinned down to within a range of a 
year,360 the court found this insufficient to prove causation and approved 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.361 As the court stated, “Doe 
I became infected by the HIV virus on one particular occasion from one 
particular product,”362 and he could even have been exposed to blood 
                                                 
351 Id. at *11. 
352 See, e.g., Spencer, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (granting defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment because of plaintiff’s inability to conclusively prove causation). 
353 See Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 380 F.3d at 406. 
354 Moore v. Armour Pharm. Co., No. 88-392-CIV-T-15C, 1990 WL 369571, at *6 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 1990). 
355 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
356 HIV infections may take at least two to six weeks to manifest after the date of in-
fection. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (S.D. 
Iowa 2001), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 380 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 2004). 
Additionally, a person can be exposed to AIDS and not become infected with the disease. 
See id. 
357 Hepatitis C has a six to eight-month incubation period. Mellis v. N.Y. State Dept. of 
Corr., 779 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (App. Div. 2004). 
358 See Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 380 F.3d at 406 (“[T]here is no way to identi-
fy the moment of infection.”). 
359 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1009. 
360 See id. at 1008. 
361 See id. at 1012. 
362 Id. at 1013 (emphasis added). 
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products containing HIV after the date of infection, which would not im-
pact his diagnosis.363 
However, in the same case for plaintiff Doe II, because the experts 
generally agreed on the date of infection, and because the named defend-
ants owned one hundred percent of the market share of Factor IX at the 
time of infection, the court denied summary judgment for the defend-
ants.364 Yet Doe II had not even successfully proven causation: he had 
only managed to convince the court that a material question of fact exist-
ed, allowing the case to proceed to trial.365 
Thus, the burden of proving causation is incredibly high, and this is 
only for the plaintiffs to pass summary judgment. Doe v. Baxter Health-
care Corp. is a fairly recent case, and it indicates that, to establish causa-
tion, a petitioner involved in blood product litigation must be able to de-
termine the exact product, on the exact date, by the exact manufacturer. If 
the court applied this standard in the current hypothetical case, it would 
likely be hopeless for any significant number of the victims to ever over-
come their burden of proof. The court’s reasoning in Baxter Healthcare 
makes it virtually impossible for a victim of tainted blood product to ever 
successfully prove causation. 
d. Injury 
Finally, to obtain a favorable ruling, the plaintiffs must also show inju-
ry, which in this theoretical case should not be problematic. Generally, 
damages are self-evident when the plaintiff suffers from a potentially fatal 
disease contracted through contaminated blood products.366 Examples of 
other injuries the plaintiffs might assert include medical expenses, loss of 
earnings, and mental and emotional distress.367 
e. Outcome 
Although the plaintiffs in a hypothetical negligence case against HMA 
and PBBP could establish that they were owed a duty of care, and that the 
defendants had breached that duty, the cause of action would ultimately 
                                                 
363 Id. 
364 See id. at 1009, 1017. 
365 See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1017. 
366 See Dorney, supra note 19, at 163. 
367 See David Polin, Hepatitis from Blood Transfusion, 37 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 
§ 14 (1984). 
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fail because the plaintiffs would be unable to sufficiently prove that the 
defendants’ negligent conduct caused their injury. 
CONCLUSION 
The blood business is a “uniquely favored industry,”368 one of the most 
profitable and critical enterprises in the world, as it permits the sale, manu-
facturing, and transfusion of life-saving blood and blood products.369 
American methods have long been considered the gold standard of blood 
distribution,370 and American blood and plasma companies dominate the 
majority of the world market.371 Especially because most countries do not 
have the resources to gather as much blood and plasma as the U.S. does,372 
they depend on the American system to be safe, transparent, and progres-
sive. However, as the hypothetical Arkansas prison lawsuit demonstrates, 
the system ultimately fails the victims. 
Courts and legislatures face difficult decisions in dealing with the lia-
bility of blood and blood product suppliers because they must wrestle with 
the dueling desire of ensuring the safety of the product for the population 
and the responsibility of keeping the blood industry solvent and willing to 
continue selling such a risky commodity.373 The industry almost always 
triumphs in this calculus.374 Despite victims’ repeated attempts to hold 
these producers accountable for tainted blood, the blood business remains 
effectively unscathed because so few lawsuits against it prove success-
ful.375 
As the Arkansas plasma center hypothetical illustrates, under the 
American legal system, it is virtually impossible for casualties of tainted 
blood products to conclusively determine causation.376 Because of blood 
shield laws, negligence is a plaintiff’s only realistic recourse against the 
blood industry; however, these negligence actions repeatedly fail because 
the plaintiffs cannot meet the high burden of proving causation, and courts 
                                                 
368 Conk, supra note 291, at 1089. 
369 See Miller, supra note 31, at 473. 
370 Telephone Interview with Kelly Duda, supra note 22. 
371 See Feldman, supra note 43, at 671–72. 
372 As with Canada and Britain. See generally 14 Oct. 2010, PARL. DEB., H.C. (2010) 
534 (U.K.); KREVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 50. 
373 See Shu-Acquaye & Innet, supra note 58, at 33–34. 
374 See Feldman, supra note 43, at 671–72. 
375 See id. 
376 See Su, supra note 92, at 948. 
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generally refuse to ease this burden by permitting market share or alterna-
tive liability theories.377 
In the hypothetical case discussed, even if viewed in the light most fa-
vorable to the plaintiffs, a negligence cause of action would fail, despite 
the mountain of allegations that the Cummins Plasma Center operated in a 
manner that clearly created a breeding ground for disease, and resulted in 
a substantial likelihood of tainted plasma products being distributed. 
The outcome of such a hypothetical is extremely relevant to the global 
blood industry today, as foreign victims of contaminated blood sold from 
America continue to seek justice.378 Emerging economies like China and 
Brazil are facing litigation from victims of their own for-profit plasma 
centers,379 and they will likely look to United States’ precedents for guid-
ance. Another example is Iraq, whose previous government forcibly in-
jected HIV-tainted plasma imported from France into a group of hemo-
philiacs.380 This group now hopes to bring a civil suit against the French 
companies involved, which, thus far, have ignored calls for acknowledg-
ing accountability.381 Considering the United States’ position in helping 
establish the emerging Iraqi legal system,382 the reaction of our own courts 
to similar cases influences the likelihood of this lawsuit ever being tried, 
and thus the chances of success for the sufferers. 
The Arkansas Prison Plasma hypothetical illustrates one example of a 
system that provides blood and plasma providers with the wrong incen-
                                                 
377 See Dorney, supra note 19, at 176–77. 
378 See, e.g., In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Liab. Litig., 595 F. 
Supp. 2d 855, 858 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (examining the foreign plaintiffs’ allegations that after 
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tives.383 Despite the inquiries and responses of the Canadian and British 
governments, which clearly show that the conditions at Cummins were 
unacceptable and that hemophiliacs suffered and died as a result of these 
conditions, the United States has failed to respond to calls for an investiga-
tion, or even to acknowledge the victims at all.384 
The American system discourages this story from being told,385 and 
even worse, it protects those who callously bled donors from high-risk 
populations and who, knowing the danger of infection to the recipients, 
distributed and sold the blood products anyway. 
Most of the victims of tainted blood are looking for something much 
more important than money: they want recognition and retribution, and the 
United States has refused even to encourage the blood industry to supply 
this acknowledgement.386 In the heartbreaking words of one hemophiliac 
attempting to join a class action suit: “I don’t give a shit about the com-
pensation. What are the chances of putting these criminals in jail? I’ll give 
you everything I’ve got. I’ll sell my house, I’ll sell my business—just get 
those sonofabitches!”387 Unfortunately, the bloody, dirty, sad truth is that 
this victim, like so many others, will probably never prevail. 
Sophia Chase
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